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LAWYERS WITHOUT BORDERS
CATHERINE A. ROGERS*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, attorney regulation presumed that lawyers
practice in the delimited geographical jurisdiction where they are
licensed.' Most lawyers were sole practitioners and, insofar as they
existed, law firms were relatively intimate organizations of
partners who all knew each other and primarily serviced local
clients on local matters in local courts.2 In recent years, this

* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University,
University Park, Pennsylvania & UniversitA Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan,
Italy and member of the American Society of International Law ("ASIL") Task
Force on Global Professional Responsibility. I would like to thank the members of
the ASIL Task Force, and particularly Detlev Vagts, for their contributions to my
thinking on these topics. Of course, the views, and any accompanying errors, are
mine alone. I am also grateful for the many ideas and insights I received from
Jose Alvarez, Gary Born, Bill Dodge, Andy Kaufman, Claudia Krapf, Laurel Terry,
Marco Ventoruzzo, Ted Schneyer, Bill Simon, David Wilkins, Stephen Wilske, and
the many other global advocates who have been willing to share with me their
experiences. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of
Nevada at Las Vegas Law School, at the Globalization of the Legal Profession
Symposium at Harvard Law School, and to the City Bar of New York Task Force
on International Practice, where it benefitted from questions and comments of
those present. Finally, I owe a debt to Jamie Coleman and Susham Modi for their
excellent research assistance.
1 See Charles W. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-of-State
Lawyers, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2002) (arguing that lawyers are habitually
divided into two groups: those who are locally licensed and therefore subject to
regulatory power of the local bar, and those who are not).
2 As Mary Daly explains:
Until recently, lawyers infrequently practiced in more than one state.
Law firms rarely established branch offices, with the possible exception
of an office in Washington, D.C. or in a distant city to meet the particular
needs of a single client. Consequently, in searching for ethical guidance,
lawyers, courts, and disciplinary authorities looked only to the
professional standards adopted by a single jurisdiction, the lawyer's state
of general admission or the court to which the lawyer had been admitted
pro hac vice.
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localism has given way to globalism. 3 The figures measuring this
transition are staggering. Prior to World War II, only four U.S. law
firms had an overseas office. 4 By 2004, the number had grown to
381 foreign law offices in seventy-six cities in forty-eight different
foreign countries. 5 Several other data points portray similarly
dramatic tales of international expansion, 6 including gains for
smaller and medium-size law firms in the global market for legal
services. 7 Professional regulation of attorneys is still attempting to
catch up with these demographic developments, most recently
through revisions to Model Rule 8.5 ("Rule 8.5" or the "Rule").
The thesis of this Article is that, while Rule 8.5 is a meaningful
Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice-Is Model
Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715, 719
(1995). For an insightful analysis of how the term "partner" has become
something of a misnomer as U.S. law firms have erupted into large corporate-like
structures that sprawl across multiple jurisdictions, see David B. Wilkins, Partner,
Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1264 (2007).
3 The intermediate step between the local and the global is multijurisdictional domestic practice and the rise of the national law firm. This Article
does not directly address this phase, but several other scholars have documented
this development and its significance for the legal profession. See generally Gary
A. Munneke, MultijurisdictionalPractice of Law: Recent Developments in the National
Debate, 27 J.LEGAL PROF. 91 (2003) (exploring developments in multi-jurisdictional
practice and arguing that reform is essential); John F. Sutton, Jr., Unauthorized
Practice of Law by Lawyers: A Post-Seminar Reflection on "Ethics and the
Multijurisdictional Practice of Law," 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1027 (1995) (discussing
unauthorized practice of law by out-of-state lawyers); Gerard J.Clark, The Two
Faces of Multi-Jurisdictional Practice,29 N. Ky. L. REV. 251, 273-77 (2002)
(entertaining a proposal to eliminate restrictions on interstate practice).
4 See Carole Silver, Winners and Losers in the Globalization of Legal Services:
Situating the Market for Foreign Lawyers, 45 VA. J. INT'L. L. 897, 916-17 (2005) (noting
the growth of foreign offices backed by U.S. law firms). Notably, these statistics
come from a study of only sixty firms, so the overall number is probably higher.
5 Id.
6 For example, as Laurel Terry notes, "six of the world's ten highest-grossing
law firms had more than 50% of their lawyers working in countries outside of the
firm's home country." Laurel S. Terry, A "How To" Guide for Incorporating Global
and Comparative Perspectives into the Required Professional Responsibility Course, 51
ST. Louis U. L.J. 1135, 1138 (2007) (quoting The Global 100, AM. LAW, Oct. 2006, at
139).
7 See Carole Silver, Regulatory Mismatch in the Marketfor Legal Services, 23 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 487, 495 (2003) ("The international label is not claimed only by
large law firms; even small firms participate in this specialty.").
This
phenomenon is a logical counterpart of the increased participation of smaller and
medium sized companies in the global economy.
See Elena V. Helmer,
International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, "Civilized," or Harmonized?, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 35, 40 (2003) (noting the increase in the number of
American law firms that provide arbitration services).
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attempt to respond to an obvious need, it ultimately causes more
problems than it resolves and must be revised.
The American Bar Association first sought to address
attorneys' activities outside the state in which they were licensed
by promulgating Model Rule 8.5 in 1983.8 Originally, the Rule
expressly disavowed any application to transnational (as
distinguished from interstate) activities.
Instead, it left all
questions about conflicting ethical rules abroad to "agreements
between jurisdictions or... appropriate international law." The
problem was that there were no such agreements or rules of
international law, which meant international activities of U.S.
attorneys, were virtually unregulated. 9
In later versions, Rule 8.5's limitation to interstate practice was
abandoned and it was expressly extended to transnational
activities. 10 With respect to advocacy, which is the focus of this
Article, 1 the text of the Rule-now applicable to international
practice -provides that "for conduct in connection with a matter
pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the
tribunal sits [shall apply], unless the rules of the tribunal provide
"12
otherwise ....

8 As Mary Daly has explained, Model Rule 8.5 is not an ethical rule at all, but
a choice of law rule. See Daly, supra note 2, at 755 (noting that Model Rule 8.5 is "a
rule about choosing rules"). The Model Rules have been frequently amended
since the American Bar Association adopted them in 1983, with the most recent
amendment in 2002.
9 Advocates may still be subject to other forms of regulation, such as criminal
and civil sanctions, as well as oversight by other administrative agencies. For an
extended discussion of the various mechanisms that regulate attorney conduct, see
David B. Wilkins, Iho Should Regulate Lawvyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1992).
10 Specifically, Comment 7 provides "[t]he choice of law provision [contained
in Rule 8.5] applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice." MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 7 (2002).
11 Unless otherwise indicated, this Article considers only those aspects of
Rule 8.5 that apply to advocates, meaning attorneys involved in dispute
resolution activities. Other provisions of the Rule pertaining to advisory or
transactional work have different choice of law provisions in Rule 8.5. See infra
note 27, and accompanying text.
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 8.5(b)(1) (2002). The full text of Rule
8.5 is as follows:

(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this
jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction,
regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted
in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services
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Currently, eighteen states have adopted Rule 8.5, and another
nineteen have adopted similar rules. 13 The Rule was adopted in
response to a request by international attorneys for more guidance,
and, for all its flaws, it does bring a measure of certainty. For these
reasons, it represents an important development and a meaningful
starting point in cross-border regulation of global advocates.' 4 At
bottom, however, the Rule is a failed experiment as applied to
international advocacy and it must be reconsidered.
Rule 8.5's advocacy provisions were meant to provide
guidance about which rules to apply when U.S. attorneys are
operating in foreign legal systems or before international tribunals.
In these contexts, many aspects of U.S. attorneys' conduct may be
considered unprofessional, unethical, or even illegal. For example,
in most foreign and international tribunals, U.S.-style crossexamination techniques and aggressive litigation tactics are
considered unprofessional at least, and sometimes overtly
in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority
of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as
follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the
rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the
tribunal provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is
in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to
the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's
conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer
reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will
occur.
Id.
13 For a chart illustrating the implementation of Rule 8.5, see Am. Bar Ass'n
[ABA], State Implementation of ABA Model Rule 8.5 (2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/quick-guide-8.5.pdf.
14 The Council of Law and Bar Societies of Europe ("CCBE") Code of
Conduct for European Lawyers has identified the problem, but not offered any
real guidance or solution, other than that attorneys inform themselves. Article 2.4
of the CCBE Code provides: "When practising cross-border, a lawyer from
another Member State may be bound to comply with the professional rules of the
Host Member State. Lawyers have a duty to inform themselves as to the rules
which will affect them in the performance of any particular activity." CCBE CODE
OF CONDUcT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 2.4 (2006). For a more
comprehensive overview of recent developments in this area, see Laurel S. Terry,
U.S. Legal Ethics: The Coming of Age of Global and Comparative Perspectives, 4 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 463, 494 (2005) [hereinafter Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics].
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unethical. Meanwhile, attorney advertising and contingency fees,
both standard practices in the United States, are regarded as
ethically contemptuous in most foreign legal systems. In some
foreign countries, having a private individual or company serve
process is downright illegal, as is the fundamental practice of
preparing a witness for upcoming testimony. On the other hand,
in contrast to their foreign counterparts, U.S. attorneys are
generally bound by more extensive confidentiality obligations, by
more restrictive notions of conflicts of interest, and by specific
duties to report client perjury to a tribunal. 15 With many of these
examples, it would be difficult or impossible for an attorney to
abide by both sets of rules, and Rule 8.5 was designed to provide
clear guidance about which rules to follow.
The problem, however, is that the current version of Rule 8.5
does not resolve these conflicts. Perhaps even worse, when
applied to international tribunals, the Rule almost ensures that U.S.
attorneys will be abiding by ethical rules that are different from
their opposing counsel's and that are utterly unrelated to the
relevant tribunal or its procedures (unless the tribunal has adopted
its own rules). One signal that Rule 8.5 misses its mark is that the
outcomes it prescribes shocked practitioners who have appeared
before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal or the International Court of
Justice. Informal survey research reveals that the attorneys had no
idea that they were bound by Dutch ethical rules. The reason for
this surprise, as discussed in more detail below, is that the physical
location of these international tribunals is largely unrelated to their
purposes and procedures, or to the expectations of lawyers or
presiding judges and arbitrators. 16
Ultimately, Rule 8.5's shortcomings can be traced to its
assumptions about territoriality and the historical relationship
between the jurisdiction of tribunals and the licensing of attorneys.
These assumptions stem from the Rule's original focus on domestic
attorneys in a federal system who are licensed in one jurisdiction
and occasionally perform professional services in another sister
state. International practice was added as something of an
15 For an overview of these and other the ways that U.S. ethical obligations
and procedural practices conflict with those of foreign systems, see Peter C.
Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in Justifying Some Current
Norms of Transactional Lawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49 (2001); Catherine A.
Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conductfor International
Arbitration,23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341 (2002); Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics, supra note 14.
16 See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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afterthought, but apparently without fully considering the
important ways in which conceptions of jurisdiction and
territoriality differ in transnational, as opposed to federal, contexts.
As I describe in Section 2, superimposing a federal rule to the
transnational
system
produces
certain
conceptual
and
terminological problems that make it difficult to apply to global
legal advocates.
These problems are exacerbated when the Rule is applied to
practical situations. In Section 3, I illustrate the problems caused
by some of these applications. Finally, in Section 4, I make
affirmative proposals for how to rectify some of the problems that
Rule 8.5 leaves unresolved. To that end, I outline an approach to
conflict-of-laws analysis that will produce more satisfactory
solutions. For international tribunals, I argue that national rules
can never provide an adequate substitute for tribunal-specific
rules, and call on international tribunals to better articulate and
develop their own rules.
Finally, with respect to enforcement, I argue for a coordinated
approach that has licensing and regulatory authorities working
with foreign and international tribunals and regulatory authorities.
In other areas of transnational regulation - such as antitrust,
securities, and corruption - international networks have developed
to promote transnational regulatory governance. 17 In large part,
these networks have been built by international lawyers operating
in various capacities, such as government officials, judges, NGO
organizers, and client representatives. It is time now for them to
18
turn similar efforts to their own self-regulation.
17

The seminal work on international networks is, of course, ANNE-MARIE
A NEW WORLD ORDER 20-21 (2004).
Some efforts are underway:

SLAUGHTER,
18

At the 2006 and 2007 ABA Annual Meetings, the E.U.-U.S. Legal Services
Summits were co-hosted by the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of
Europe (CCBE), and the Asia-U.S. Legal Services Summits included
lawyers and bar leaders from Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. The ITILS Task Force also convened
discussions with Latin American bar leaders at the Fall Meetings of the
Section of International Law in Houston in 2005 and in Miami in 2006.
The ITILS Task Force also communicates regularly with the International
Bar Association (IBA), the Union Internationale des Avocats (UIA), the
Law Society of England and Wales, and the Law Council of Australia to
exchange information, coordinate initiatives, and discuss strategies.
Laurel S. Terry et al., Transnational Legal Practice, 42 INT'L LAW. 833, 842 (2008).
Many of these developments are being driven by concerns about regulation of
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REGULATING U.S. ATTORNEYS ABROAD

When U.S. authorities finally attempted to catch ethical
regulation up with the global activities of modern lawyers, they
borrowed for the international arena a rule that was drafted for
domestic multi-jurisdictional practice in a federal system. This
Section reviews the textual and conceptual problems that result
from that extension.
2.1. The Drafting of Rule 8.5
As enacted in 1983, a quick read of Rule 8.5 might have
suggested that it does apply to U.S. lawyers practicing law outside
the United States. As noted above, the 1983 version of the Rule
provided that "for conduct in connection with a matter before a
tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits
[shall apply], unless the rules of the tribunal provide
otherwise ... ."19 The textual breadth of the Rule was belied by a
specific exclusion of international lawyers from the Rule.
International lawyers themselves had vigorously fought for this
exclusion.20 As a result of their efforts, Comment 6 to the 1983
version of the Rule disavowed any application to transnational or
international legal practice 2' and instead left any conflict-of-laws
analysis to nonexistent "agreements between jurisdictions or...
22
appropriate international law."
Some years later, U.S. lawyers engaged in international practice
apparently concluded that vagaries about which ethical rules apply

legal services in international trade. See Laurel S. Terry, The GATS and Legal
Services in Limerick, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 635 (2007) (addressing recent servicerelated GATS developments).
19 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1983).
20 Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics, supra note 14, at 525 (2005).
21 Comment 6 to the original version of the Rule, which provided that it was
"not intended to apply to transnational practice," was deleted in August 2002. See
ABA, Ethics 2000 Commission Reporter's Explanation of Recommendation,
Changes to the Rule, in ABA CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

1982-2005, 827, 831 (2006) [hereinafter Reporter's Explanation] (noting that the
Commission made this modification because it "believe[d] that lawyers engaged
in transnational practice ought to be governed by this Rule's choice of law
provision").
22 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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could be more perilous than liberating. 23 Accordingly, in 2001, the
International Law section of the ABA requested that Rule 8.5 be
revised to provide greater choice-of-law guidance to transnational
and international practitioners. 24
As a result, the 2002 revisions deleted Comment 6 and replaced
it with the current Comment 7, which expressly rejected the
exclusion, providing instead that the "choice of law provision
applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice." 25 The
consequence of this change was to make Rule 8.5's general
provision -that conduct by attorneys in connection with litigation
is governed by the "rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal
sits" -applicable to activities by U.S. attorneys abroad. Similar to
former Comment 6, the new Comment 7 makes reference to
"international law, treaties or other agreements between competent
regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions." 26 In contrast to
the earlier Comment, however, these international sources only
become applicable if they produce a different result than the basic
choice-of-law provision of Rule 8.5.
Another important change brought by the Ethics 2000
Commission is that the word "tribunal" replaced the earlier
version's references to "court."
This change was made in
recognition of "the increasing use of alternative dispute-resolution
processes," and extended the Rule to "binding arbitration and
other methods of formally adjudicating the rights of parties." 27 As
a result of these changes, for those states that have adopted it, Rule
8.5 now purports to provide choice-of-law guidance for U.S.
attorneys who appear before foreign courts, international courts
and tribunals, and international arbitral tribunals.
As described in more detail below, the current version of Rule
8.5 creates as many problems as it resolves. These problems may
have been foreshadowed by the drafting history of the provision,
which does not reveal any express consideration of the unique
complications involved in international and transnational

23 See Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics, supra note 14, at 525 (showing that lawyers are
becoming increasingly sensitive to the comparative ethics issues, and possibly
liability as well, through the ABA Section of International Law's urged reforms).
24

Id.

25 MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 8.5 cmt. 7 (2002).

26

Id.

27

Reporter's Explanation, supra note 21, at 829-30.
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advocacy. 28 More fundamentally, the current version of Rule 8.5
proceeds from misconceptions about the nature of international
litigation and arbitration, as well as the character and content of
foreign ethical regimes. These erroneous underpinnings produce
particularly anomalous results when applied to advocates in
international practice.
2.2. Special Provisionsfor Advocates
In an acknowledgement that advocacy raises distinct issues
from other types of legal representation, Rule 8.5 includes special
provisions for advocates. Specifically, it provides that "for conduct
in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules [of
professional conduct] of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits
[shall apply], unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise." 29
Rule 8.5's provisions regarding non-adjudicatory transnational
activities admit that "no single test... can be applied to determine
the appropriate choice-of-law rule in each case." 30 Accordingly,
that part of the Rule permits some flexibility for attorneys and
disciplinary authorities to assess the appropriateness of ethical
rules to particular conduct. 31 In contrast, the Rule's provisions for
28 To be fair to the drafters of Rule 8.5, many of these problems are not
readily apparent even to international dispute resolution practitioners, and would
be difficult to forecast without direct experience in the international proceedings.
29 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 8.5(b)(1) (2002). Specifically, the 1993
version provided that for conduct "in connection with a proceeding in a court
before which a lawyer has been admitted to practice... the rules to be applied
shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the
court provide otherwise." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 8.5(b)(1) (1993),
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/2001/ABA-CODE.HTM
#Rule_8.5.
30 ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 397 (2000). Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) addresses transnational
transactional and corporate practice, providing

for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's
conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a
different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the
conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's
conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer
reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will
occur.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
31 This flexibility is not without its problems. One

member of the committee
"filed a statement designated 'dubitante' in which he expressed significant due
process and equal protection reservations" with the rule. Daly, supra note 2, at
757.
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advocates contain no such qualifying language, and hence permit
no discretionary analysis regarding which rules would be
appropriate. The justification for this inflexibility is that the
advocate's ethical obligations are firmly tethered to the location of
the adjudicatory decisionmaker.
There are good reasons for special choice-of-law rules that
apply exclusively to adjudicatory settings, and for linking those
rules to the adjudicatory decisionmaker. One of the most pressing
reasons for insisting on a clear rule is to avoid the possibility that
opposing attorneys in the same proceeding could be subject to
different ethical rules. As Detlev Vagts cogently explains:
[I]t would not be workable to allow the counsel for
opposing sides in a civil case to enter the courtroom subject
to different rules.... It would not do to prohibit one lawyer
from a civil law jurisdiction from interviewing a witness
before the trial while the American lawyer would not only
be allowed to do so but "would be guilty of professional
negligence if he or she presented an un-interviewed
32
witness."
While this equality-of-arms consideration is a powerful reason
to regulate attorneys appearing in international and transnational
adjudicatory settings, 33 as illustrated below, application of Rule 8.5
fails to ensure the desired result.34 Even worse, in some contexts it
may actually increase the likelihood that attorneys in the same
adjudication will be abiding by different rules.
Another reason why adjudicatory settings deserve special rules
is that presiding tribunals are presumed to have a particularized
interest in regulating attorneys appearing before them, as well as

32 Detlev Vagts, Professional Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and
Resolution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 677, 690 (2000).
33 Impartiality is an attribute of adjudicators, which in turn demands audi
alteram partem, or equality of the parties. See, e.g., V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 16-17 (1980) (discussing the importance of
audi alteram partem in the formation of procedural rules). As told in the Sanskrit
play Mrichchakatica,as far back as 485 B.C., courts in India honored this principle
by not allowing the fact that a complainant was the king's brother-in-law to
influence the court's integrity. Id. at 17.
34 See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
effects Rule 8.5 may have on the proceedings in front of the International Court of
Justice).
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particular authority over the conduct of those attorneys. 35 An
ordinary choice-of-law rule based on the weight of territorial
contacts, as found in the other provisions of Rule 8.5, might not
give adequate deference to the tribunal's interest or procedural
authority. While Rule 8.5 ties applicable ethical rules to the
tribunal, however, it does not afford them an explicit role in
enforcing those rules.36 This oversight is not a direct affront to
international tribunals, many of which do not contemplate for
themselves an express role in regulating attorneys who appear
before them. It is, however, a missed opportunity to help U.S.
regulatory authorities in interpreting and enforcing the applicable
37
rules.
2.3. Blurry Lines and Built-In Ambiguities
The stated aim of the current version of Rule 8.5 is to provide
for "relatively simple, bright-line rules" 38 for attorneys and
regulators to determine what ethical rules apply to
multijurisdictional, and now also transnational, legal activities.
35 Since Rule 11 went into effect, federal judges have shown a willingness to
make use of it to regulate attorneys appearing before them. See, e.g., Victor H.
Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 793, 793 (1991) (noting that "[i]n the seven years since Rule 11 was amended,
it has generated well over a thousand judicial opinions"). On the other hand,
"[tihe majority of Continental rules of civil procedure and those influenced by
them impose no direct compulsory sanctions." Rolf StUrner, Transnational Civil
Procedure: Discovery and Sanctions Against Non-Compliance, 6 UNIFORM L. REV. 871,
877 (2001). France, however, does allow for an "astreinte," a type of procedural
fine, although the application of this principle is very rare in practice. Id.
36 International arbitral tribunals do not necessarily enjoy the competence to
enforce national ethical rules. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text
(discussing how international tribunals often lack the rules or jurisdiction to
enforce ethical conduct).
37 See infra Section 4.4 (discussing how to find the right agent to regulate
lawyers internationally).
38 The purpose was specifically to make "as straightforward as possible"
which rules apply, a goal that is described by the Comments to the Rule as being
"in the best interest of both clients and the profession." ABA COMM. ON ETHICS
AND PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,

RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF

DELEGATES 4 (1993). Professors Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes have argued

that making Rule 8.5 applicable to international law practice was done in response
to insistence by French professional regulatory authorities as a condition of their
recognition of American lawyers as conseil juridique, or "juridical advisors" in
English. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING:
A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr § 8.5:101 (2d ed.
Supp.) (1994). Others have questioned the authority for this justification, which
does not appear in the notes or comments. Daly, supra note 2, at 757.
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While several of the problems of Rule 8.5 only become apparent in
its application,39 others are evident from its very wording. These
ambiguous references appear to result principally from the fact
that the Rule was written against the background of assumptions
that apply in domestic contexts.
This Section exposes the
conceptual and interpretative problems raised by the text of Rule
8.5, whereas Section 3 will take up more generally whether the
substantive provisions of the Rule are appropriate for international
advocates.
2.3.1.

GeographicalLocation and Ethical Rules

A fundamental assumption underlying Rule 8.5 is that there is
a meaningful link between the place of adjudication and the
decisionmaker's jurisdiction. This assumption is undoubtedly
predicated on the fact that such a link is generally present in the
domestic U.S. court systems where Rule 8.5 was originally
intended to apply.
However, no comparable systematic or
meaningful link generally exists with international courts and
tribunals.
In domestic systems, the jurisdiction of a court, and the identity
of advocates who practice before it, are determined by the
geographic realities of where it is located. For example, the state
courts of New York are located physically in New York, are
established under the Constitution of the State of New York, and
have jurisdiction that is predicated on (even if not strictly limited
by) the geographic boundaries of New York State. In this example,
as with all national courts, the identity of the court, its
jurisdictional mandate, and its place of operation are inherently
interconnected
and
effectively
indivisible.
Moreover,
unauthorized-practice-of-law rules affirm and reinforce the interrelationship with place by requiring that all attorneys who practice
before a New York court are members of the New York Bar,
working in association with a lawyer who is a member of the New
York Bar or admitted to the New York Bar pro hoc vice. 40 This
These problems are discussed infra Section 3.
Specifically, Model Rule 5.5(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not practice law
in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R.
5.5(a) (2002). For a more thorough analysis of the rules restricting practice in
states where attorneys are not licensed, see generally Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking
Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by
TransactionalLawyers, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 665 (1995).
39
40
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interconnectedness is a consequence of the fact that national courts
are instruments of national sovereignty (or related political subdivisions), which in turn is an inherently territorial-based
41
concept.
The same inter-relationship with place does not ordinarily exist
with either international courts or other international tribunals.
Instead, with public international courts and tribunals, precisely
the opposite is true.42 The physical location of most international
tribunals is either an arbitrary choice produced through historical
accident, negotiation, and compromise, or a choice predicated on
other non-substantive issues such as convenience. 43 As a result,
and in contrast to domestic courts, normally the location of an
international tribunal is intentionally and systematically unrelated
to the tribunal's jurisdiction and procedures, or to the presumptive
44 This
identity of the lawyers who appear before it.
detachment
from the local procedures of the tribunal's geographic seat is one
feature that makes a tribunal "international." 45 It also means that

41 See Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of PersonalJurisdiction,57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 871-72, 872 nn.116-20 (1989) (describing relationship
between original rules of jurisdiction and rules of territorial sovereignty, and
listing early cases that approached jurisdiction based on international law).
42 For a discussion of international arbitration tribunals and legal domicile,
see infra notes 48-54, and accompanying text.
43 For example, the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal was located in The Hague
because of the ready availability of the Peace Palace, support from the Dutch
government, and The Hague's history of neutrality. See Michael I. Kaplan, Solving
the Pitfalls of Impartiality when Arbitrating in China: How the Lessons of the Soviet
Union and Iran Can Provide Solutions to Western Parties Arbitrating in China, 110
PENN ST. L. REV. 769, 801 (2006) (attributing the success of the Tribunal to The
Hague's "chronicled history of neutrality").
4 There are some instances in which international tribunals have jurisdiction
over domestic crimes, which may imply the presence of lawyers from the relevant
jurisdiction. For example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a treaty-based
Tribunal that was established through a resolution of the U.N. Security Council.
It is unique, and somewhat controversial, in that it depends solely on substantive
crimes that are defined under domestic Lebanese law. See Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The
Subject-Matter Jurisdictionof the Special Tribunal For Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
1125, 1126 (2007) (contrasting the Special Tribunal for Lebanon with tribunals for
other nations such as Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Bosnia, among others).
45 There are also "hybrid international-domestic tribunals (such as the ad hoc
Court for East Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia)." Michael P. Scharf, Forward:Lessons From
The Saddam Trial, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 1, 1 (2006). Another recent example of
a hybrid international-domestic tribunal is the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) in
Baghdad:
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U.S. lawyers practicing before the International Court of Justice or
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in The Hague do not expect to be
governed by the ethical rules applicable in local judicial
proceedings in The Netherlands.
This disconnect between place, jurisdiction, and legal
background of advocates seems to have been acknowledged, at
least implicitly, by authorities who might otherwise attempt to
regulate attorneys appearing before international tribunals within
Unauthorized-practice-of-law requirements,
their jurisdiction.
which govern appearances in local courts and sometimes apply to
exempt international
most often
arbitrations,
domestic
46
sought to inject its
State
has
Meanwhile, no
arbitrations.
professional regulation of attorneys into the activities of
international tribunals that might be located in their territory.47 As

The IHT merits characterization as an internationalized domestic
tribunal because its statute and rules of procedure are modeled on the
U.N. war crimes tribunals ...and its statute provides that the IHT is to
be guided by the precedent of the U.N. tribunals and that its judges and
prosecutors are to be assisted by international experts. But the IHT is not
fully international or even international enough to be dubbed a hybrid
court, since it is seated in Baghdad, its prosecutor is Iraqi, it uses the Iraqi
Criminal Code to supplement the provisions of its statute and rules, and
its bench is composed exclusively of Iraqi judges.
Id.
46 Even the California Supreme Court case that touched off the firestorm of
concern about multijurisdictional practice by finding that New York lawyers in an
arbitration in California were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
included a footnote exempting international arbitration from its analysis. See
Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court., 949 P.2d 1, 7
(Cal. 1998) (noting that the California Code of Civil Procedure permits parties to
an international commercial dispute to either "appear in person or be represented
or assisted by any person of their choice," regardless of whether that person is
licensed to practice law in California or any other jurisdiction).
47 In something of a historical oddity, some jurisdictions insist that party
representatives in international arbitrations be lawyers and, in some more
unusual instances, that they be locally licensed lawyers. This latter requirement
can be understood as an assertion of jurisdiction to regulate attorneys appearing
in an arbitration within a State's territory, though today virtually all jurisdictions
have eliminated such rules. See Richard A. Eastman, Commercial ArbitrationRepresentation by Foreign Counsel - Illegal Practiceof Law in California,94 AM. J. INT'L
LAW 382, 403 (Bernard H. Oxman ed., 2000) (discussing the trend in many
countries of "liberalizing the right of representation"). In the United States,
several states have prohibited appearances by out-of-state lawyers in in-state
arbitrations as the "unauthorized practice of law." In other cases, they have
limited the number of arbitration appearances that are permitted. Somewhat
surprisingly, these controversial provisions usually contain exceptions for
international arbitration. This exception is odd since outside of international
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a result, international tribunals operate as regulatory oases from
the perspective of local disciplinary authorities in the territory
where they are located.
The fact that national regulatory
authorities do not actively assert any interest in the operations of
international tribunals suggests that these national regulatory
authorities, whose rules are supposed to apply, have implicitly
rejected the choice of ethical rules selected by Rule 8.5. Moreover,
it foreshadows the need for specialized rules for these tribunals
and raises implicit doubts about the appropriateness of using
territory-based choice-of-law rules as a substitute.
2.3.2.

Where Does a Tribunal "Sit"?

Another textual ambiguity in Rule 8.5 is its equation of an
international tribunal's legal situs with the place where it "sits."
Under Rule 8.5, the ethical rules of the place where a tribunal "sits"
apply to a U.S. attorney's conduct in connection with proceedings
before that tribunal. Within the United States, the term "sits" is
uncontroversial because domestic courts only sit, and consequently

arbitration contexts, foreign attorneys are not allowed to perform any other legal
activities without being licensed or obtaining permission to practice in the state.
See Steven C. Nelson, American Bar Association Section of International Law and
PracticeReports to the House of Delegates, 24 INT'L LAW. 583 (1990) (discussing claims
arising from international sale of goods); George A. Riemer, A State of Flux: Trends
in the Regulation of MultijurisdictionalPractice of Law, 64 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19 (2004)
(focusing on the regulations and the possible future trends and problems
regarding temporary practice). See also ABA Center for Prof'l Responsibility, State
Implementation of ABA
MIP Policies (Mar. 3, 2009),
available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/recommedations.pdf (providing a reference
chart regarding various state rules); Stephen Gillers, It's an MJP World: Model Rules
Revisions Open the Door for Lawyers to Work Outside Their Home Jurisdictions, 88
A.B.A. J. 51 (Dec. 2002) (describing the revision of ABA Model Rule 8.5 as a
response to Birbrower). The exception for international arbitrations arguably
provides foreign lawyers greater rights than attorneys from sister states, who
should presumably be entitled to greater leeway, not less, than foreign attorneys.
The international exception essentially permits foreign attorneys to appear in any
arbitration (since their participation would almost by definition signal the
international character of a case), whereas attorneys from other states can only
appear in some cases, namely those that are international. Other states have
similar rules. See FLA. BAR REG. R. 1-3.11 cmt. (2009) ("This rule applies to
arbitration proceedings held in Florida where 1 or both parties are being
represented by a lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or a nonUnited States jurisdiction .... However, entire portions of subdivision (d) and
subdivision (e) do not apply to international arbitrations.").
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have their "seat" or "legal domicile," 48 in one place. 49 With
international tribunals, however, there are a diversity of
arrangements, which make it difficult to determine where a
tribunal "sits" within the meaning of Rule 8.5.
International tribunals may "sit" in one place, but have their
"seat" in another. For example, the Statute for the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea provides that the Tribunal has its
"seat" in "the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg in the Federal
Republic of Germany," but "may sit and exercise its functions
elsewhere whenever it considers this desirable." 50
With
international public law tribunals, such as the Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, the separation of the tribunal's seat from the location of
actual hearings is rare, although not unheard of. The same is not
true of international arbitral tribunals.
The "seat" of an international arbitration is not simply a point
on a map, but is instead a legal concept that attaches a host of
important consequences to the proceedings and the resulting
award. As Gary Born explains, "the procedural law of the
arbitration is virtually always the law of the arbitral state, which
governs both the 'internal' and 'external' procedural aspects of the
arbitration." 51 For these reasons, international arbitration can be
said to have a "rootedness" to its seat 52 that public international
tribunals do not generally have. It is relatively common for
international arbitral tribunals to hold hearings and meetings in

48 1 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

1240 (2009)

(defining "seat" to mean "legal domicile" or "juridical home" and tracing the
concept to relevant international conventions and national laws).
49 One historical exception is that U.S. Circuit court judges and Supreme
Court justices "rode a circuit" from court to court, which is where circuit courts
got their name. For a brief history of a circuit riding, see David R. Stras, Why
Supreme CourtJustices Should Ride Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1714-17 (2007).
50 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea annex VII, Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 1, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 (emphasis added).
51 1 BORN, supra note 48, at 1243. In the absence of party agreement, the law
of the seat can impose procedural and evidentiary requirements and prohibitions,
as well as provide default rules that act as gap fillers. Id. Meanwhile, the courts
in the arbitral seat may provide important functions in support of the arbitration,
such as facilitating arbitrator appointments (again in the absence of agreement),
ruling on arbitrator challenges, issuing interim relief or ordering documentary or
testimonial evidence. See id.
52 Id. at 1250.

20091

LAWYERS WITHOUT BORDERS

1051

places other than the legal "seat" 53 - in a literal sense, to "sit" in a
place other than the arbitral "seat." On some occasions, the "seat"
of an arbitration can be implied legally and differ entirely from
either the place identified by the parties or the place where the
hearings physically take place.54 In these (rare) circumstances, the
language of Rule 8.5, which refers to the place where tribunal
"sits," raises even more significant ambiguities about how it is
intended to be applied in the context of arbitral proceedings.
Ultimately, for reasons that are explained below, 55 international
tribunals must develop their own ethical rules. It seems inevitable
that conscripting national ethical rules into service be accepted in
the short run as a temporary, second best solution. Even as a
temporary solution, however, those rules should not be identified
based on the jurisdiction where an international arbitration
tribunal "sits," but instead where it has its "seat." Otherwise, Rule
8.5 ascribes to the place where an a tribunal sits an importance that
was never intended by either the architects of these tribunals or the
parties appearing before them.
2.3.3.

What "Rules" of Conduct Apply?

Another ambiguity revealed through the application of Rule 8.5
is that it designates the "rules" of the place where a tribunal sits.
In the domestic context, the term "rules" would seem to refer to the
code of attorneys' professional conduct in a sister state. Arguably,
even in the domestic context, this definition would be incomplete.
As several scholars have identified, "[tihe rules and institutions

53 Id. at 1249. All leading institutional arbitration rules and many arbitration
statutes have similar provisions. See, e.g., LONDON CT. INT'L ARBITRATION R., art.
16.2 (1998) ("The Arbitral Tribunal may hold hearings, meetings and deliberations
at any convenient geographical place in its discretion; and if elsewhere than the
seat of the arbitration, the arbitration shall be treated as an arbitration conducted
at the seat of the arbitration and any award as an award made at the seat of the
arbitration for all purposes."); United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law
[UNCITRAL], Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 16(2), U.N. Doc. A/31/17
(1976) ("The arbitral tribunal may... hear witnesses and hold meetings for
consultation among its members at any place it deems appropriate, having regard
to the circumstances of the arbitration.").
54 For example, an English court recently ruled that the legal seat of an
arbitration was England where the parties had provided for the application of
English procedural law, notwithstanding the parties' purported designation in
their contract of Scotland as the seat of the arbitration. See Braes of Doune Wind
Farm (Scotland) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Bus. Servs. Ltd. [2008] EWHC 426 (TCC).
5 See infra Section 4.4.
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controlling lawyers' conduct comprise a complex system" 5 6 that
embodies not only ethics rules embodied in codes, but also
statutes, procedural rules, inherent judicial power, agency law,
criminal law, and tort law.57 Thus, for example, if the California
Bar Court were to determine under Rule 8.5 that Nevada's rules of
conduct apply to a particular instance of alleged lack of diligence
and competence, it will look not only to the Nevada Rules of
Professional Conduct, but also to Nevada's bar association and
judicial opinions interpreting and applying those rules, as well as
to procedural rules and malpractice standards that give meaning
and context to those rules. In other words, identifying the
applicable "rules" of another jurisdiction is not as simple as
opening a book to the page where its code of conduct is written.58
In cross-border contexts, identifying the applicable rules can be
much more difficult. As an initial matter, the codification of ethical
rules is a relatively recent phenomenon and not all foreign
jurisdictions have reduced their standards of conduct to such
codes. 59 Even in countries that have written codes, such as
56 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer
Discipline:An Empirical Analysis Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regulation of
Lawyers, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 797 (2004).
57 See Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in
the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 174 (1996) (examining
strategies of legal ethics courses in law school).
58 This observation reveals a larger problem: drafters of Rule 8.5 apparently
did not consider how its application to inter-state practice might be different from
international or transnational practices. Important differences do exist, however,
which have critical implications for regulation of attorney ethics and conduct.
The ethical rules of individual U.S. states are relatively homogenous because the
ethical rules of most individual states are predicated on the ABA's Model Rules.
As a result, there are only isolated, even if occasionally significant, differences
between the ethical rules of state regulatory authorities. More importantly,
because they are borne out of the same legal culture and operate in largely similar
legal systems, generally no one is really offended, for example, if an attorney
abides by Florida confidentiality rules instead of Alabama rules.
58 By contrast, the ethical rules among various nations, and the national legal
frameworks in which they exist, are considerably more variable than among the
ethical regimes of individual U.S. jurisdictions. As a result of these differences,
regulatory authorities in different national jurisdictions may be profoundly
concerned if foreign attorneys violate local ethical norms, as illustrated by the
criminalization of, and diplomatic protests against, certain activities by foreign
lawyers, such as serving process or taking depositions. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
59 "In most countries the rules governing lawyers are set by statute." PIETER
H.F. BEKKER Er AL., AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., REPORT OF THE ASIL TASK FORCE ON INT'L
PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY 7 & n.19 (2007), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs
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England, there remain "many unwritten rules of professional
conduct." 60 It is unclear what role, if any, "unwritten rules" should
have if, for example, a U.S. bar were applying English ethical rules
under Rule 8.5.
Even when a foreign jurisdiction has a written code of conduct,
there are complex and delicate questions about how to establish or
"prove" the precise content or interpretation of those rules. When
foreign substantive law governs a particular issue in U.S. litigation,
it cannot simply be researched by the court, particularly if the law
is in a different language. 61 As a result, it is often presented
through experts, 62 potentially multiple experts, who may disagree.
Ethics is an area where difficulties of proof are potentially even
more complicated than substantive law. In the United States, even
with respect to purely local practice, there are multiple, often
overlapping or inconsistent bodies of rules that purport to regulate
particular attorney conduct. 63 When the rules are foreign, written
in a foreign language, interpreted through foreign precedents, and
potentially introduced through competing experts, the room for
confusion and uncertainty may be considerable. At least one
drafter of Rule 8.5 expressed apprehension about the due process
64
implications of ambiguities regarding which rules apply.
/taskforcereport.pdf (citing Law No. 71-1130 of Dec. 31, 1971, Journal Officiel de
la R~publique Fran~aise [.0.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 31, 1971, p. 167,
the Bundesanwaltsordnung [Federal Rules of Procedure], Jan. 15, 1959 BGB1. I at
565 (F.R.G.), and the Practicing Attorneys Act, Law No. 205 of 1949 (Japan)).
60 Maimon Schwarzschild, Class, National Character, and the Bar Reforms in
Britain:Will There Always Be an England?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 185, 196 (1994).
61 See Louise Ellen Teitz, From the Courthouse in Tobago to the Internet: The
Increasing Need to Prove Foreign Law in U.S. Courts, 34 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 97, 111
(2003) ("The problem is exacerbated when the foreign law is in another language,
and the court must either rely on a treatise in English or a translation of a foreign
treatise.").
62 See id. at 107 ("The testimony of experts allowed to offer opinions under
the Federal Rules of Evidence often forms the basis for a court's determination of
the foreign law.").
63 As one joint committee by the ALI and the ABA concluded, "No area of
local rulemaking has been more fragmented than local rules governing attorney
conduct." American Law Institute-American Bar Association, Excerpts From
Special Study Conference of Federal Rules Governing Attorney Conduct Los Angeles,
California January9-10, 1996, Q247 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 311, 333
(1996). As a result, the same report explains, ambiguities raised by the existence
of ambiguous and multiple bodies of overlapping rules has "led to due process
and 'void for vagueness' challenges in increasing numbers." Id. at 343.
64 Letter from David B. Isbell to Stephen Gillers (December 2, 1992), in
Susanna Felleman, Ethical Dilemmas and the Multistate Lawyer: A Proposed

1054

U. Pa. J. In t'l L.

[Vol. 30:4

Apart from the potential problems of identifying and
interpreting rules governing particular conduct, there are also
questions about the role of social and customary practices that can
often alter the essential meaning of a rule. Consider, for example,
two recent empirical studies that investigated professional conduct
in the United States and England. The studies evaluated levels of
compliance with conflict of interest rules among American lawyers
and English solicitors. 65 Both systems operate in the same
language and originate from the same legal tradition, and
apparently have relatively similar detailed written rules regarding
such conflicts. When the results of the two studies are compared,
however, they seem to suggest that textual similarity conceals
significant divergences in their applications. 66 Apparently, U.S.
attorneys are more fastidious in their efforts to comply with
conflict rules, even when such adherence is contrary to their
business interests. English solicitors, on the other hand, appear to
be more willing to bypass rules that are obsolescent or
counterproductive.
Various hypotheses may account for these disparate rates of
compliance, including differences in enforcement mechanisms, 67 in
the likelihood of negative social sanctions, in client tolerance, in the
competitive structure of the legal services market, or in perceptions
of the possibility of genuine harm. Regardless of why these
differences exist, however, they raise important questions about
the complexities about how the regulatory authorities of one nation
can apply the "rules" of another. Could or should a U.S. state
supreme court or regulatory authority account for the social
Amendment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1500, 1515 n.116 (1995) (explaining that an amendment to Rule 8.5
would "set out a relatively clear and simple set of choice of law rules" which
would "be of considerable practical value to practitioners").
65 See Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Law Firm Conflicts in the 21st Century:
Implications of the Globalization of Legal Services and the Growth of the "Mega Firm," 18
GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 521 (2005) (comparing JANINE GRIFFITHS-BAKER, SERVING Two
MASTERS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE MODERN LAW FIRM (2002), with SUSAN
SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE (2002)).
66 See id.
67 In the United States, departure from the rule is likely to draw a
disqualification motion from opposing counsel. The United States is nearly
unique in permitting opposing counsel to raise motions for disqualification, and
certainly unique in allowing the disqualification process to rise to the level of
litigation strategy. See GRIFFITHS-BAKER, supra note 65, at 77-78 (noting that
disqualification actions by attorneys grew in Europe with the arrival of U.S. law
firms).
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context and institutional functions of the authorities that would
apply the relevant foreign ethical rules? For example, in applying
English conflict of interest rules, should a U.S. regulatory authority
take account of the fact that English attorneys are not actually
The underlying
punished for certain types of violations?
justification for Rule 8.5 seems to be that a U.S. advocate appearing
in proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction should be regulated as an
attorney from that jurisdiction. Literal application of foreign
ethical rules, without regard to how they are interpreted and
applied by the national regulatory bodies, would alter -sometimes
dramatically- the nature and meaning of those rules. 68 These
complications in interpreting and applying foreign ethical rules
make it difficult for U.S. attorneys to accurately understand the
rules against which their conduct will be measured.
2.3.4.

What is a "Matter"?

The advocacy provisions of Rule 8.5 are predicated on a model
that assumes that there is a single "matter" pending before one
"tribunal" for any particular dispute. While this may be a dubious
proposition in any large, complex domestic case, it is certainly
faulty with regards to sizable international disputes. Various legal,
procedural, and strategic differences between national systems
create even more powerful incentives for parties to forum shop in
international cases than in purely domestic cases. 69 As a result,
parties to the same international dispute often seek to litigate
simultaneously in the courts of two or more countries. 70 Moreover,
in the absence of transfer, consolidation, shared jurisdictional
precepts, and any international equivalent to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause for enforcement of judgments, a transnational case is
more likely to be litigated in multiple courts than a purely
domestic case. Even within a single case, judicial cooperation is
often necessary, for example, to obtain discovery from foreign
sources or to enforce a final judgment in a foreign jurisdiction.
68 As David Wilkins has persuasively demonstrated, when domestic U.S.
institutions apply rules, they necessarily impose a "substantive tilt" that is the
product of their own institutional history and objectives, as well as conceptual
and cultural biases. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 851. The force of this observation is
amplified when the cultural and historical traditions of those institutions span
national and linguistic boundaries.

69 GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN

UNITED STATES COURTS
70

See id.

521 (4th ed. 2007).
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This potential for multiple courts to be involved in a single case
challenges the underlying model on which Rule 8.5 is based, which
contemplates a single "matter" that is "pending before" one
tribunal. An earlier version of the Rule had referred to the more
delimited term "proceeding" (instead of "matter"). 71 The purpose
of the new language, according to the Ethics 2000 Commission
Reporter's Explanation of Recommendation, was to extend the
Rule so that it "control[s] from the moment the matter can be said
to be before a tribunal (typically the date the case is filed), even if
no specific 'proceeding' is pending at the time the conduct
occurs."72 Although the Reporter's Explanation goes on to state
that "[n]o change in substance is intended," 73 the new formulation
appears to create an ambiguity in international cases.
Consider, for example, a case that is pending before the federal
district court in the Southern District of New York, but which
requires that a deposition be taken before (in effect taken by) a
judicial officer in Germany or Brazil. In international cases
litigated in U.S. courts, Rule 8.5 would require that the professional
conduct of attorneys abroad is subject only to evaluation under a
relevant state's ethical rules as long as that conduct was "in
connection with" a case pending in a U.S. court. As noted in the
introduction, however, like many other countries Germany and
Brazil both ethically and legally prohibit attorneys from taking a
deposition of a witness. 74 The judicially administered deposition in
Germany or Brazil would not be considered a "proceeding" under
71 Although the term "proceeding" is not defined in the Model Rules, the
Canons of Judicial Ethics define a "pending proceeding" as a process that will
reach a "final disposition." See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCr Canon 3(B)(9) cmt.
(2003) (defining the phrase "pending proceeding"). This definition comports with
other common definitions of "proceedings" as roughly equivalent to
"adjudication." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 45, 1251 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the
terms "proceedings" and "adjudication").
72 Reporter's Explanation, supra note 21, at 830.
73 Id.
74 According to the U.S. Department of State:
The Government of Brazil asserts that, under Brazilian Constitutional
Law, only Brazilian judicial authorities are competent to perform acts of
a judicial nature in Brazil. Brazil has advised it would deem taking
depositions in Brazil by foreign persons to be a violation of Brazil's
judicial sovereignty. Such action potentially could result in the arrest,
detention, expulsion, or deportation of the American attorney or other
American participants.
U.S. Dep't of State,
Brazil Judicial Assistance (2009), available at
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_672.html.
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the former version of the Rule, which would make it easy to
determine that New York rules apply. Under the newly broadened
terminology,
however, the deposition would arguably be a
"matter" 75 that is "pending" in the German court, 76 and as a result
there would be two "matters" that are "pending" and the activities
of the lawyer in Germany could be said to be "in connection with"
either or both of them.
By using the term "matter," Rule 8.5 does not succeed in clearly
indicating a single set of ethical rules that apply to given conduct.
Instead, it raises the possibility that the rules of more than one
jurisdiction may be applied. 77 The resulting confusion undermines
the brightline guidance that Rule 8.5 was supposed to bring, even
if, as argued below, the very goal of a single brightline rule for any
particular case may itself be a flawed objective.
2.4. Conclusion
For activities before international tribunals, many of the
interpretive problems of Rule 8.5(b)(1) could be avoided if those
tribunals had their own ethical rules, which would then apply
under Rule 8.5(b)(2). Unfortunately, while the need for such rules
seems palpable, only a few international tribunals have created
them.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), and more recently the International Criminal
Court, have adopted codes for professional conduct for attorneys
appearing before them. The WTO Appellate Body and the
International Court of Justice have declined to take this step, while

75 The Model Rules do not define the term "matter." Some rules do. For
example, the District of Columbia Bar's Rule of Professional Conduct 1.0(h)
defines "matter" to mean "any litigation, administrative proceeding, lobbying
activity, application, claim, investigation, arrest, charge or accusation, the drafting
of a contract, a negotiation, estate or family relations practice issue, or any other
representation, except as expressly limited in a particular rule." Under this
definition, the German court-supervised deposition would apparently constitute a
"matter."
D.C. BAR R. OF PROF'L CONDUCr 1.0(h), available at
http:/ /www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/ethics/legal-ethics/rules-of-professional
-conduct/ amended-rules/ rule-one/ rule01_00.cfm.
76 Note that the text of Rule 8.5 leaves uncertainty about which ethical rules
apply does not suggest that there should only be rules from a single jurisdiction
that governs an advocate's conduct.
77 Since the Reporter's Explanation indicates that the change in terminology
was not intended to result in a substantive change, this Article sets aside this
ambiguity raised by the term "matter" and instead treats the current text as
effectively synonymous with the earlier version of Rule 8.5.
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international arbitral tribunals and arbitral institutions (which
promulgate the rules that govern arbitral proceedings) do not
formally articulate any standards of professional responsibility for
counsel. 78 To the contrary, on some occasions arbitral tribunals
have affirmatively disclaimed responsibility for doing so on the
grounds that professional regulation is non-arbitrable or beyond
the jurisdictional power of the tribunal. 79 The next Part explores in
more detail the problems associated with applying national ethical
rules in international proceedings, as well as some of the problems
with the current choice of law approach to regulating attorneys
involved in transnational litigation.
3.

FROM DRAFTING DEFECTS TO AWKWARD APPLICATIONS

The focus until now has been on ambiguities and conceptual
problems in the text of Rule 8.5. This Section takes up the more
substantive problems that arise when Rule 8.5 is applied in specific
contexts. As expected, the conceptual problems manifested in the
text are amplified in application of the Rule.
3.1. National Courts
There is only one instance in which Rule 8.5 actually clarifies
the obligations of an attorney. That is in the relatively peripheral
example of dual-licensed attorneys whose primary legal education
and licensing is in a foreign country, but who also hold an LL.M.

78 As this Author has argued elsewhere, despite the formal absence of ethical
regulation of attorneys in international arbitration, such regulation inevitably
occurs:
Even if they remain unspoken, such perceptions of apparent misconduct
(or ineptitude) inevitably affect arbitrators' decisions on the merits,
computations of damage awards, and assessments of costs and fees....
These informal sanctions violate the most fundamental notions of
procedural fairness by imposing punishments for violations of unknown
rules and without any opportunity to be heard. Such reactions to
perceived attorney misconduct might also be sanctioning an innocent
party.
Clients pay substantive awards, costs, and fees, but the
misconduct may belong wholly to the attorney.
Rogers, supra note 15, at 376-77.
79 Award in ICC Case No. 8879, in HORAcIO A. GRIGERA NAON, CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 289 RECUEIL DES COURS 9,
159 (2001) (affirming that even if claims asserted against counsel for one party for
ethical violations were within scope of arbitration clause, they would be nonarbitrable, because they concern "the criminal consequences of alleged advocate
misconduct").
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degree from a U.S. law school and a secondary bar admission in a
U.S. jurisdiction that permits admission for foreign-educated
applicants. 80 It is estimated that most of these foreign-educated
lawyers work either on the transactional side of multi-national law
firms, or return to their own country of origin, using the U.S. bar
admission as a credential (not unlike the LL.M. degree itself). 81 In
the latter instance, these attorneys may be appearing before the
national courts of their home jurisdictions. Under Rule 8.5, these
attorneys would not be responsible for abiding by the ethical rules
of the U.S. jurisdiction from which they obtained their baradmission-cum-credential. In this limited example, Rule 8.5 seems
to have its truly desired effect of eliminating application of a set of
ethical rules that have little or no relevance to particular legal
activities. In other situations, the Rule effectively excuses global
advocates from exercising professional discretion regarding what
ethical rules to follow.
3.1.1.

Ethical Discretionin Abiding by Foreign Ethical Rules

One of the defining features of global advocates is that they
routinely engage in regulatory arbitrage.8 2 This process requires
them to evaluate the inter-relative effects of particular rules in
determining which ones can or should apply to a particular
situation. This is a unique and valuable skill. When it comes to
conflicting codes of ethics, however, Rule 8.5 excuses attorneys

80 See Howard A. Levine, The Regulation Of Foreign-EducatedLawyers in New
York: The Past, Present, and Future of New York's Role in the Regulation of the
International Practice of Law, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 631 (2003). While not the
primary target of Rule 8.5, this group is not insignificant. The number and size of
LL.M. programs have expanded in recent years, and as a result the number of
foreign-educated lawyers sitting for U.S. bar exams has increased. In 1992, 972
foreign-educated lawyers sat for the New York bar examination, while in 2006,
the number had grown to 3630. Compare 1992 Bar Examination Statistics, B.
EXAMINER, May 1993, at 23, 26, available at http://www.ncbex.org/fileadnin
/mediafiles/ downloads/BarAdmissions/1992stats.pdf
(detailing the total
number of 1992 bar examinations taken by source of legal education), with 2006
Statistics, B. EXAMINER May 2007, at 6, 9 available at http://www.ncbex.org
/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/BarAdmissions/2006stats.pdf (detailing the
total number of 2006 bar examinations taken and passed by source of legal
education).
81 See Carole Silver, The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizingthe U.S.
Legal Profession, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1039, 1050, 1078 (2002) (describing the postU.S. bar examination career trends amongst foreign-educated lawyers).
82 See infra Section 4.2.
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from using this skill or from exercising any professional discretion
regarding what rules apply to their conduct.
Apart from dual-licensed attorneys with a foreign primary law
degree, as described above, U.S.-licensed attorneys rarely appear as
advocates in foreign legal matters. The most likely situation in
which they take part in a foreign proceeding is not as advocates,
but as experts on foreign law or other sui generis roles. For
example, U.S.-licensed attorneys might participate in a deposition
taken before a foreign judicial officer, as described above, in
proceedings to request interim relief in a U.S. matter made to a
foreign tribunal, or in proceedings to enforce a U.S. judgment
abroad. In any of these situations, the fact that these activities are
undertaken "in connection with" a U.S. legal proceeding would
appear to mean, under Rule 8.5, that U.S. ethical rules would be
applied in any disciplinary action brought by a U.S. regulatory
authority. Since the conflict of laws rule in 8.5(b)(1) does not admit
any exception, it seems to instruct authorities to disregard
violations of foreign ethical rules that may occur in these
83
situations.
Even though Rule 8.5 would only subject U.S. attorneys to U.S.
rules when activities are connected to U.S. proceedings, it would
not preclude an ethical "double jeopardy" or "double deontology"
problem if a foreign regulatory authority, such as the German or
Brazilian disciplinary authority in the example above, decided to
assert jurisdiction over a particular activity.8 4 In that instance, the
German bar would not apply Rule 8.5 and would more likely
directly apply German ethical rules to activities before a German
judge in a German court room, even if the activity was undertaken

83 As described in more detail below, attorneys may still be accountable for
violations of foreign law under Rule 8.4. See infra Section 3.1.2. Larger questions
about how and when U.S. lawyers should be ethically permitted or required to
violate foreign law are beyond the scope of this Article and will be taken up in a
forthcoming companion article, The Global Advocate.
84 The doctrine of double jeopardy only formally applies with respect to
criminal proceedings within the United States.
The fundamental concern
underlying the doctrine -that an individual should not be subject to prosecution
by multiple authorities for the same underlying conduct -has an exception when
separate sovereigns are applying the sanctions. See United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (applying the constitutional practice of double jeopardy). The
activities of global advocates, almost by definition, are subject to review by
separate sovereigns. Thus, while the doctrine does not formally apply, the same
underlying concern is present.
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in connection with a U.S. proceeding or "matter." 85 Apart from the
fact that disciplinary action by foreign bars has not yet
materialized, U.S. attorneys have other reasons to conform to
foreign ethical rules, such as avoiding possible foreign criminal
prosecution or possible risks to the success of the legal activity
itself. 86 This exercise of professional judgment, which experienced
global advocates inevitably already undertake, is currently
obscured and obviated by Rule 8.5. While U.S. attorneys should be
encouraged to consider and comply with foreign ethical rules, they
are instead ethically excused from even considering other
potentially relevant ethical rules whenever they can claim the
"cover" of an overarching U.S. "matter" that occasioned their
overseas activities. Under this interpretation, even the advertising
and direct solicitation by U.S. attorneys of Bhopal victims in
flagrant contravention of Indian ethical rules would presumably be
defensible to the extent those actions are permitted by U.S. ethical
87
rules.
3.1.2.

Criminal Acts and Prejudice to the Administration of
Justice

Even though Rule 8.5 appears to permit a U.S. attorney to
violate foreign law and professional conduct rules, that conclusion
does not necessarily end the analysis. Model Rule 8.4(b) defines

85 As noted above, regulatory authorities per se have not to date asserted
such interest, though some nations have imposed sanctions through their criminal
laws. See supra notes 46-47, and accompanying text.
86 For example, a German judge might not complete a judicially supervised
deposition if it is learned that U.S. counsel was improperly speaking to the
witness.
87 Some activities by attorneys in Bhopal, most particularly direct solicitation
in the days after the disaster, appear to also violate U.S. ethical rules. See David T.
Austern, Is Lawyer Solicitation of Bhopal Clients Ethical?, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1985,
at 16 ("One Washington, D.C., lawyer claimed to have signed contingency fee
agreements with more than 7,000 plaintiffs within five working days of the gas
leak-approximately one agreement every 60 seconds."). To the extent that the
ambiguous reach of state bar jurisdiction at the time of the disaster prevented
formal disciplinary action, Rule 8.5 provides a welcome mechanism for
monitoring and prosecuting such abuses. The more delicate question is what
consequences should flow from attorney advertising in India that is prohibited
under Indian law, but permitted under U.S. ethical rules. Rule 8.5 would seem to
suggest that, as long as advertising is undertaken in connection with a U.S.
"matter," attorneys should not be concerned about being disciplined for violating
Indian ethical rules. This outcome does not appear to be consistent with the spirit
or intent of Rule 8.5.
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"professional misconduct" to include the commission of "a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
88
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."
Meanwhile, Rule 8.4(d) provides that any "conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice" is also professional
misconduct.8 9 If we asked the drafters of Rule 8.4 whether they
intended the terms "criminal acts" and "the administration of
justice" to include foreign law and systems, they would probably
reject the notion. Rule 8.4, after all, was drafted when ethical
regulation, including Rule 8.5, was still limited to domestic
practice. The extension of Rule 8.5 to transnational practice
requires consideration of whether and how to apply these
provisions beyond the U.S. system.
If Rule 8.4 were not interpreted to preclude attorneys from
violating foreign law, then Rule 8.5 would seem to ethically excuse
violations of foreign law and foreign ethical rules when
undertaken in connection with a U.S. matter. 90 Moreover, if these
provisions of Rule 8.4 do not apply to foreign and international
law, then U.S. ethical rules raise important questions about
international judicial comity and attorneys' ethical obligation to
obey the law and contribute to the rule of law. Rule 8.5 would
transform a violation of foreign law from an unintended mishap by
an "accidental legal tourist" 91 into conduct that is considered
88 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 8.4(b) (2002).

89 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 8.4(d) (2002).

90 This interpretation finds an analogue in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley

Act, which imposes reporting obligations on attorneys whenever they have
credible evidence of a "material violation of law." 15 U.S.C. § 7245. But "material
violation" is defined to mean a violation of "applicable U.S. federal or state
securities law ...[a] fiduciary duty arising under federal or state statutory or
common law, or a similar... U.S. or state law. A violation of foreign law is not
considered a 'material violation.'" Stanley Keller, Implementing the SEC's Standards
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SP018 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.
675 (2008). The complex issues of an attorney's obligations to obey international
and foreign law are beyond the scope of this Article, and will be taken up instead
in a future companion article, The Global Advocate.
91 Global advocates can be considered "accidental tourists" because, for the
most part, U.S. law schools do not adequately prepare graduates to handle
international and transnational cases. The internationalization of the U.S. law
school curriculum is a relatively recent phenomenon. While there has been
significant innovation in this area, there remain doubts about how well U.S. law
schools are preparing students for international or global practice. See Carole
Silver, Adventures in Comparative Legal Studies: Studying Singapore, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 75, 78 (2001) ("[Diespite the attention to internationalization and the
increased presence of international and comparative courses in the curriculum,
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ethically acceptable or at least irrelevant to U.S. regulatory
authorities. This outcome seems to do as much harm to the
perceived integrity of the U.S. lawyers as the underlying violations
themselves.
Notwithstanding the ambiguities, it seems more likely that
Rule 8.4's provisions extend, at least prima facie, to foreign law
and foreign judicial systems. State regulatory authorities have
applied Rule 8.4(b) to everything from driving under the influence
of alcohol, to acts of domestic violence, to willful failure to file an
income tax form, to sexually inappropriate behavior, to drug
possession. 92 Commentators have suggested that the gravity of the
offense is less important when it is related to the practice of law. 93
Under this reasoning, it seems unlikely that global advocates'
activities would be precluded from the purview of Rule 8.4 simply
because they implicate foreign laws. After all, their ability to
operate outside the U.S. legal system is the primary skill that global
advocates market to their clients. Under this analysis, if Rule 8.4's
provisions are extended to international and foreign law and
foreign systems, then they appear to resurrect many of the conflicts
that Rule 8.5 sought to put to rest.
3.2. Public InternationalLaw Tribunals
Rule 8.5(b)(1) is equally pernicious when applied to conduct
connected to international tribunals as it is when applied to
international cases in national courts. Reference to "tribunals" was
there remains doubt that sufficient numbers of U.S. law students are enrolling in
international and comparative law courses"). Law schools in most other countries
make international law a mandatory course. See Liliana Obregon, The Colluding
Worlds of the Lawyer, the Scholar and the Policymaker:A View of InternationalLaw from
Latin America, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 145, 150-51 & n.20 (2005) (comparing the role of
international law in law school curricula in Latin America, Europe, and the
United States).
92 See, e.g., People v. Meier, 954 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Colo. 1998) (concluding that
"any practicing attorney would know" that asking a prospective and obviously
vulnerable divorce client about the size of her breasts would "adversely reflect on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law"); Lawyer Disciplinary Actions, ARK. LAW.,
Summer 2001, at 40 (2001) (attorney disbarred for violation of 8.4(b) for conviction
of two violations of Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE Act"));
Lawyer Disciplinary Actions, ARK. LAW., Summer 1997, at 37 (1997) ("use and
possession of illegal drugs constituted "a criminal act that reflects adversely on [a]
lawyer's ...fitness as a lawyer" in violation of Model rule 8.4(b)").
93 See Thomas H. Moore, Can Prosecutors Lie? 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 961,
971-72 (2004) (suggesting that various jurisdictions have approached this matter
in different ways).
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specifically intended to extend the Rule to non-judicial settings,
such as international arbitral tribunals. 94 Obliging U.S. attorneys
who appear before international courts, international tribunals, or
international arbitration tribunals to adhere to the rules of the place
where such tribunals "sit" virtually ensures that U.S. attorneys will
be bound by rules that are different from those applicable to
opposing counsel and wholly unrelated to the proceedings
themselves.
Consider, for example, what effect Rule 8.5 would have on
proceedings before the International Court of Justice, which sits in
The Hague. This location was chosen because the Netherlands is a
neutral jurisdiction and a facility was made available to the Court
by the Carnegie Foundation, which owns and administers the
Peace Palace. None of the members of the Tribunal are necessarily
Dutch.95 Neither Dutch law, nor Dutch procedure, nor the Dutch
bar, nor even the Dutch language has any consistent relationship
with, or even relevance to, proceedings before the Court. 96 Under
Rule 8.5, however, an American attorney appearing before the ICJ
would be charged with understanding and abiding by Dutch
ethical rules, which are written in Dutch (though also available in
English)97 and designed to apply in Dutch domestic legal
proceedings. Moreover, this result is only half of the problem.
Non-lawyer representatives are permitted to appear, but would

94 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
95 The Court is composed of fifteen judges, who are elected for terms of office
of nine years by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.
Although some Dutch judges have served, it is neither required nor common for a
small country like the Netherlands to have a judge on the court. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, Chapter 1: Organization of the Court art. 2-33, June
20, 1945, 59 Stat. 1062, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-cij.org
/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_I (explaining that judges
are elected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of
persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration).
96 The official languages of the ICJ are English and French. Id. art. 39. It is
possible that, on occasion Dutch lawyers appear before the ICJ, just as Dutch
judges may be appointed to it, though their appearance is a matter of coincidence
rather than part of an established or systemic relationship. See, e.g., Mark S. Ellis,
The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing Before the InternationalCriminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 949, 959 (2003) (describing the highprofile trial of Dusko Tadic and how, "Professor Michail Wladimiroff, one of the
Netherlands' most respected criminal lawyers was assigned as lead counsel for
Mr. Tadic").
97 Netherlands Bar Ass'n, Legislation, Rules and Regulations, available at
http://www.advocatenorde.nl/english/legislation/vademecum.asp.
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not be required to abide by Dutch ethical rules. 98 Similarly,
attorneys who are licensed in some jurisdiction other than the
United States, where there is no Rule 8.5, would not be bound by
Dutch ethical rules.99
As this example demonstrates, application of Rule 8.5 to
international tribunals has the pernicious effect of injecting a third,
wholly unrelated set of ethical obligations into international
proceedings, thus further splintering the existing ethical divide.
Meanwhile, for all the reasons analyzed above, U.S. regulatory
authority will encounter considerable difficulty in interpreting
Dutch ethical rules, or applying them in proceedings before the
ICJ, where they were not intended to apply.
3.3. InternationalArbitration
As noted above, Rule 8.5 means that U.S. attorneys appearing
in an international arbitration are bound by the ethical rules of the
jurisdiction in which the arbitral tribunal "sits."
Even if the
terminological problem of "sit" and "seat" is satisfactorily
addressed through interpretation, there remain questions about
whether it makes sense to bind attorneys, and as described below,
arbitrators, by the ethical rules of the arbitral seat, and whether
national regulatory authorities are the institutions best suited to
regulate professional conduct in international arbitration settings.
The former set of questions will be addressed in this Section,
whereas the latter set of questions will be taken up in Section 4.
3.3.1.

Unevening the PlayingField and Pre-EmptingClient
Prerogatives

Some of the oddities involved in applying the ethical rules of
the seat of public international tribunals also apply to the
international arbitration context and, at this point, it is worth
taking a closer look at some of their implications. One of the
consequences of linking ethical regulation to the seat (or where a
98 See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Americanization of International Litigation, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 89, 115 (2003) (noting that the ICJ does not require party
representatives to be licensed attorneys and referring to "the stateless community
of public international law lawyers").
99 For example, the applicable CCBE rule is more limited. See CCBE CODE OF
CONDUCr FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 4.1 (2006). ("A lawyer
who appears, or takes part in a case, before a court or tribunal must comply with
the rules of conduct applied before that court or tribunal.")
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tribunal "sits") is that it virtually guarantees that opposing counsel
in the same proceeding will be abiding by different rules since
other regulatory authorities do not have similar conflict of law
rules. For example, in a proceeding seated in Texas between an
American and a Mexican party, the U.S. attorney would be subject
to strict U.S. rules regarding conflicts of interest, but the Mexican
attorney would not be. The Mexican attorney instead would likely
operate under a presumed obligation (or a professional instinct)100
to abide by Mexican conflict of interest rules.
On the other hand, if the arbitration were seated in Mexico,
under Rule 8.5 Mexican conflict rules would apply to the U.S.
attorney. Although not entirely clear from my own research, it
appears that Mexican conflict of interest rules would permit many
types of representation that U.S. rules would deem to be
impermissibly conflicted. 101 As a result, a U.S. attorney appearing
in an arbitration seated in Mexico would apparently be "liberated"
from U.S. conflicts of interest arising from that representation,
perhaps to the surprise of an unsuspecting client or former client.
Under those rules, the U.S. attorney is apparently permitted to
engage in representation that would be considered conflicted
representation under U.S. rules, and would give rise to related
concerns about protections of confidential information. The injury
from the conflict and potential disclosures or misuse of confidential
information will likely be borne by a U.S. client, even though that
party likely entered the original representation with expectations
that U.S. ethical rules would continue to protect its interests into
the future and presumably never consented to the conflicted
representation.
3.3.2.

Regulating Arbitrators Below the Radar

Buried in the third note of the Reporters' Explanation of Rule
8.5 ("Note 3") is yet another extension of the Rule that so far seems
to have been overlooked by attorneys and commentators.
Specifically, Note 3 of the Reporter's Explanation provides that:

100Even if Mexican ethical rules do not purport to apply directly in
international arbitrations seated in Mexico, an attorney licensed there will
generally comport her conduct to those standards by which she ordinarily abides.
101 For an analysis of why the United States has what are regarded as
uniquely "persnickety" rules regarding attorney conflicts of interest, see
Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating InternationalArbitrators:A Functional Approach to
Developing Standardsof Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 63 (2005).
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Lawyers who participate in [arbitration and other methods
of formally adjudicating the rights of parties], whether as
neutrals or as party representatives, should be bound by the
Rules of Professional Conduct of the jurisdiction in which
the tribunal sits or by the rules of the tribunal itself if they
02
otherwise provide.
Although this provision is not part of the actual text of the
Rule, or even of the official Comments, it suggests a rather radical
extension of Model Rule 8.5 to activities of attorneys when they act
as arbitrators.
This extension has two important implications, which are dealt
with in turn below. First, at a procedural level, Note 3 subjects
attorneys' conduct when they act as arbitrators to oversight by the
bar that licensed them as attorneys. Second, at a substantive level
Note 3 implies that the rules that will be applied to their activities
as arbitrators are the same rules that apply to them when they act
as attorneys. Both of these assumptions are questionable, and raise
significant concerns for international arbitration practice.
The apparent rationale for Note 3 is that when attorneys act as
arbitrators, they do not cease to be licensed by the relevant
regulatory authority, and they should therefore still be bound by
its ethical obligations and subject to its disciplinary jurisdiction.
There are some reasons for this linkage.
Even if acting as
arbitrators, attorneys are arguably providing a form of "legal
services." Moreover, the ethical obligations of arbitrators and
attorneys seem to bear at least a superficial resemblance to each
other. Attorneys must be free from conflicts of interest, just as
arbitrators must be free from bias. Attorneys must conduct
"conflict checks" before accepting representation, just as arbitrators
have a "duty to investigate" before accepting an appointment.
Despite this superficial resemblance, however, the role of
advocate is fundamentally different from the role of arbitrator,
even if both roles can be performed by the same person. As Carrie
Menkel-Meadow points out, "[olur conventional rules of ethics are
particularly inapposite when lawyers serve in quasi-judicial roles
as arbitrators ..." 103 Attorney ethics were developed to guide and
Reporter's Explanation, supra note 21, at 830 (emphasis added).
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 162 (1999); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 71
(2002) ("When the purpose of the lawyer's work is to facilitate an agreement that
102

103
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regulate conduct of individuals acting as advocates on behalf of
clients. Applying them directly to other activities can only lead to
confusion. 104 Attorney ethical rules do not apply when attorneys
serve in roles such as Little League umpires, law school lecturers,
governmental officials, and perhaps most tellingly, judges.
Instead, there are specialized rules to regulate their activities in
those roles, just as special rules have been developed to guide and
105
regulate arbitrators.
Even if it is agreed that the content of attorney ethical rules
should not be superimposed over arbitrators' activities, there is
still a separate question of whether regulatory authorities may
nevertheless be an appropriate regulatory body to enforce the rules
that are applicable. Perhaps the most forceful argument in favor of
having regulatory authorities perform this function is that
currently there is no regulatory body that purports to be able to
regulate, or provide ethical oversight for, arbitrators. As one
scholar has wryly noted, "barbers and taxidermists are subject to
far greater regulation than [arbitrators]. " 106
When arbitral
institutions and courts preside over challenges to arbitrators or (in
the latter case) allegedly bias-tainted awards, they assess the effects
of alleged misconduct and provide a remedy to potentially
aggrieved parties. 107 They do not, however, directly regulate the
arbitrators themselves. The fact that arbitrators also generally

is acceptable to all parties rather than to attempt to maximize the individual
client's interest, conventional lawyer ethics rules have scant relevance.").
104 Nevertheless, some courts and commentators have unwisely attempted
just that. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (tying an
arbitrator's obligation to investigate possible conflicts of interest to her status and
ethical obligations as an attorney); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Mhen ADR Is Ancillary
to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts Issues, ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COsT OF LITIGATION, Dec. 1994, at 147 ("Applying this rule [regarding
conflicts of interest] to [mediation], a law firm engaging in ADR practice must
observe the rules of ethics -particularly the rules concerning conflict of interestin the ADR work and the other practice, considering them as a single practice.").
105 See Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of International Arbitrators, in THE
LEADING ARBITRATORS' GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Lawrence W.
Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2008) (giving an overview of the "proliferation of
specialized codes of ethics and rules intended to guide and govern arbitrators'
conduct").
106 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1013 (2000).
107 However, review of arbitral awards is not only an indirect assessment of
alleged arbitrator misconduct, but also a particularly anemic one.
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enjoy immunity from civil liability for misconduct 08 means that
arbitrators are insulated from virtually all mechanisms that
formally regulate lawyers, other than reputational sanctions and
related market consequences. 109
Some might argue that this regulatory vacuum should be filled
by national bar associations, even if they are not applying the same
rules that apply to attorneys. This rationale is clearly what led to
the development of the proposed Model Rule of Professional
Conduct of the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral,11 0 which if adopted
would provide that special set of rules. While this effort should
clearly be applauded as a useful development in regulating
domestic arbitrators, its utility in regulating international
arbitrators remains dubious. This point is illustrated by the fact
that other domestic efforts at regulating arbitrators usually exempt
international arbitrators.1 '
Unlike domestic arbitration, there are numerous, multi-cultural
and overlapping sources that may affect the nature of arbitral
proceedings and hence the function and professional obligations of
international arbitrators. If national regulatory authorities become
the primary interpreters and enforcers of these various sources,

108 Arbitrators generally enjoy some level of immunity from civil claims
arising from their role as an arbitrator. The scope and extent of that immunity
may vary between countries and arbitral institutions. See Susan D. Franck, The
Liability of InternationalArbitrators:A ComparativeAnalysis and Proposalfor Qualified
Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2000); 2 BORN, supra note 48, at
1652-61.
109 Clearly, the threats of professional embarrassment and negative publicity
have an effect on arbitrator conduct. Most ethics commentators agree, however,
that reputational sanctions, particularly in a rapidly growing field, are not
sufficient to regulate professional conduct. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Ethics Rules,
Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure,84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1726-27 (1998) ("Though
these rules may not give rise to civil liability, the threat of disciplinary action and
the possibility that ethical rules may provide standards of conduct in liability
actions give ample incentives for lawyers to adhere to ethical rules.").
110 The proposed Model Rule is a product of a joint undertaking by the
Center for Public Resources and the Georgetown University Law Center, which
was drafted for adoption into the Model Rules for Professional Conduct. CPRGEORGETOWN COMM'N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS IN ADR, MODEL RULE FOR THE
LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL (2002), available at http://www.cpradr.org
/Portals/0/CPRGeorge-ModelRule.pdf.
111 Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the InternationalArbitrator,20 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 957, 1014-15 (2005) (discussing various efforts to regulate domestic
arbitrators and the problems of extending those regulations to international
arbitrators).
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just as they are with attorneys, 11 2 the risk is that enforcement efforts
will lead to greater fragmentation and incoherence instead of
coherence and consensus, undermining the efficacy of
international arbitration.
4.

REGULATING ATTORNEYS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE

RESOLUTION

The first Sections of this Article have examined challenges
inherent in regulating global advocates and the limitations of Rule
8.5 and other current attempts. This final Section considers
broader and more prescriptive questions of how global advocates
should be regulated. To that end, this Section challenges the basic
approach and underlying assumptions of Rule 8.5. In Section 4.1, I
argue against an omnibus choice-of-law rule, such as Rule 8.5, in
favor of rules that prescribe different choice-of-law solutions for
different types of attorney conduct. Recognizing that limitations
will exist even with more refined choice-of-law provisions, Section
4.2 emphasizes the need to leave room for a measure of attorney
discretion in cases where violations of foreign law or ethical rules
may be justified. I explain in Section 4.3 that conflict-of-laws
stopgaps like Rule 8.5 cannot provide a final alternative because
they leave open important questions about how to define
attorneys' ethical roles and obligations when they are detached
from any particular legal system. Section 4.4 argues against
application of national rules in proceedings before international
tribunals and urges that such tribunals adopt their own ethical
rules. Finally, in Section 4.5, with respect to enforcement, I argue
that home licensing authorities are not institutionally adept to
enforce unfamiliar ethical rules applied to activities that occur in
far off and distant proceedings. I propose instead that these
authorities work in cooperation with their foreign counterparts
and international tribunals to effectuate discipline identified by
those bodies under applicable rules.
4.1. Moving Beyond One-Size-Fits-All Analysis
Conventionally, conflict-of-laws analysis seeks to identify a
single legal rule that applies to specific conduct, based on an
evaluation of the contacts of the actors involved and the competing
interests of the relevant sovereigns whose territory is implicated in
112

See supra Section 2.3.3.
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those contacts.11 3 To that end, conflict-of-laws analysis usually
begins by classifying a specific factual situation under "the
appropriate legal categories and specific rules of law."" 4 Rule 8.5
defies this analysis. Instead, the Rule replaces a specific factual
situation or event with the broad category of "advocacy before a
tribunal."" 5 Rather than parse out individual rules, Rule 8.5
prescribes substitution of an entire, monolithic code of legal ethics
that is determined by the physical location where that tribunal is
located.
Apart from being anomalous to traditional conflict-of-laws
analysis, this approach leads to disturbing results because not all
ethical rules that would be substituted out by application of Rule
8.5 are limited in their effect to the immediate proceedings. For
example, as noted above, Dutch ethical rules would apply in a
proceeding before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. 1 6 These rules
would permit a U.S. attorney to engage in what would be
considered conflicted representation before an arbitration seated in
Mexico, even though the brunt of the conflict would be borne by
another client who is not party to the current proceedings or who
entered the representation agreement without understanding that
the ethical protections existing at that time could be substituted
out.
Conversely, as noted above, the Rule also implicitly
authorizes continued violations of foreign ethical rules whenever
they are connected to a U.S. matter. Under Rule 8.5, therefore,
attorney advertising in Bhopal and pre-testimonial communication
with German deposition witnesses would still be permitted despite
being unethical (and potentially illegal) in the host countries.17
In related areas, other conflict-of-laws regimes have taken a
more careful and constructive approach. For example, in the
context of judicial procedures, conflict-of-laws analysis separates
out individual procedural events and specific activities, each of
which receives its own particularized analysis regarding which
legal rules should be applied. Under this approach, the provision
113

See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.1 (4th ed. 2004);

WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS

1-3 (3d ed. 2002). There are of course other schools that diverge from this more
conventional approach, arguing that choice of law should not be jurisdictionselecting.
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 cmt. b (1971).
115 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2002).
116 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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of notice, the exchange of pleadings, the trial itself, and -within
trial proceedings -even burden of proof and questions of witness
competence and credibility, each receive their own separate
analysis regarding which system's rules apply.1 8
This
individualized analysis is necessary because for each procedural
stage, the factors relevant to selection of an applicable rule may
have different weight, depending on the purpose of a particular
rule and the interests affected by the activity." 9
This approach is not inevitable in legal ethics, as demonstrated
by the U.K. corollary to Rule 8.5, the Solicitors Regulation
Authority's ("SRA's") Rule 15 regarding "overseas practice." 120 In
place of Rule 8.5's terse directive, SRA Rule 15 has an extensive
preface that explains how its various provisions apply. It then
slogs through the each of the rules in the Solicitor's Code of
Conduct, providing individualized guidance about the application
of each to activity abroad. Notably, U.K. confidentiality and
conflict of interest obligations continue to apply to activities
abroad, but the U.K. prohibition against contingency fees does not
apply to representation in foreign jurisdictions. As a result, SRA
Rule 15 ends up with much more salient results than Rule 8.5,
particularly regarding rules that protect clients and third parties
who are not directly involved in the relevant "matter." As Rule 8.5

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 123-139 (1971)
(highlighting the variety of different issues that require choice-of-law
determination).
119 Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides a good
summary of the factors that are generally considered in determining which rules
should be considered to determine the applicable rule of law:
118

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
120 See SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY [SRA] CODE OF CONDUCT R. 15

(2007) (providing the rules regarding overseas practice, ranging from conflicts of
laws to fee practices).
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is reconsidered, at a minimum, its application should be more
carefully modulated and tailored to fit specific ethical rules.
4.2. Regulatory Arbitrage and Professional Discretion
Another unpleasant side effect of Rule 8.5's omnibus approach
to conflict of laws is that it completely obviates the need for
attorneys to exercise any professional judgment or discretion in
selecting applicable rules. Rule 8.5 implicitly authorizes attorneys
to violate - with ethical impunity - foreign law (at least under one
possible interpretation)12' and ethical rules. 22 They are granted
this free pass to disregard foreign provisions without any
obligation that they spend even a moment of professional
reflection to assess the value of the activity to the case or the
relative importance of the foreign law or ethical rule being
violated. To be sure, attorneys may sometimes be justified in
violating foreign law, particularly if the foreign law would
significantly impede or prevent a just result in a legal proceeding
that is not exclusively subject to that nation's laws. 23 While a
violation can sometimes be justified, exercise of discretion is
necessary to determine its propriety in an individual case.
Notably, both SRA Rule 15 and Rule 2.4 of the CCBE use language
that suggests that attorneys can and should engage in some
124
evaluative process.
121 See supra Section 3.1.2. (suggesting that one interpretation of Rule 8.5
would ethically excuse violations of foreign law and foreign ethical rules when
undertaken in connection with a U.S. matter, and noting the harmful effects on
U.S. attorneys' perceived integrity).
122 As noted above, this is because in any U.S. matter, U.S. ethical rules would
apply. This interpretation assumes that other ethical rules, such as Rule 8.4, do
not separately impose an obligation to abide by foreign law or ethical rules. For a
discussion of Rule 8.4, see Section 3.1.2.
123 Cf. Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 332
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (reasoning that it was far from clear that New York had a public
policy against compelling individuals to violate foreign law, in this case a foreign
injunction against enforcing an arbitration award). The extent to which attorneys
can or should be able to violate foreign law is beyond the scope of this Article and
will be taken up in a future article, The Global Advocate.
124 Specifically, Article 2.4 of the CCBE, entitled "Respect for the Rules of
Other Bars and Law Societies," provides:
When practising cross-border, a lawyer from another Member State may
be bound to comply with the professional rules of the Host Member
State. Lawyers have a duty to inform themselves as to the rules which
will affect them in the performance of any particular activity. Member
organisations of the CCBE are obliged to deposit their codes of conduct

1074

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 30:4

Another failing of the omnibus approach of Rule 8.5 is that in
cases like the Bhopal disaster, Indian law and ethical rules
prohibiting advertising or solicitation could be, and arguably
should be applied, despite the fact that the adjudication is located
in New York. Similarly, putting aside for the moment ambiguities
about the definition of "matter" described above, German ethical
rules prohibiting pre-testimonial communication could apply to a
deposition being taken in Berlin for use in a case pending in
California. Rule 8.5 would apply to make the same body of ethical
rules apply to all these areas, in apparent disregard of Indian and
German interests.1 25 Such an indiscriminate approach is not
necessary.
SRA Rule 15, in contrast to Rule 8.5, includes a provision to
allow solicitors to comply with local law. Specifically, it provides
that "if compliance with any provision of these rules would result
in your breaching local law, you may disregard that provision to
the extent necessary to comply with that local law." 126 This rule
does more than simply reject Rule 8.5's tacit approval of violations
of foreign ethics and law. By using the word "may," SRA Rule 15
appears to permit attorney discretion in resolving conflicts
between the SRA Code of Conduct and foreign local law. In a
similar vein, though in a different framework, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4 permits, under certain circumstances, service of
process in violation of foreign law, but only after a judge has
evaluated whether such action is justified. 127 Judicial supervision
over intentional violations of foreign laws or ethical rules may be
an alternative way to ensure that such violations are duly
considered and justified.
at the Secretariat of the CCBE so that any lawyer can get hold of the copy
of the current code from the Secretariat.
CCBE CODE OF CoNDucT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 2.4

(2006).
125 Notably, India, Germany and other countries are still able to prohibit
these activities and prosecute attorneys who are caught violating these
prohibitions. Within national systems, however, violations of law and rules,
particularly those related to law practice and the integrity of the justice system,
are usually also regarded as ethical violations as provided in Rule 8.4.
126 SRA CODEOF CONDUCT R. 15.01(2)(c) (2007).
127 Those circumstances, most notably, include an order from a Federal
District Court judge directing such service. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f)(3) (stating that
service may be effected in a place not within any judicial district of the United
States by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be
directed by the court).
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In determining whether violation of a foreign rule is justified,
one of the most important considerations under traditional
conflict-of-laws analysis would be whether the two rules are
simply inconsistent or whether they directly conflict. Conflicting
rules exist when the rule from one system requires what the other
system forbids, raising problems that are distinct from those raised
by rules that are merely inconsistent. The problem here is that an
attorney is compelled by one system to do something that another
system prohibits.
The conflict, in other words, creates an
inescapable double deontology problem that entails an
unavoidable risk of professional discipline, though not necessarily
in the attorney's home jurisdiction. By way of a concrete example,
consider a letter by a French attorney to a U.S. attorney that is
marked confidential, but explains the conditions under which her
client would agree to settle. Under French ethical rules, an
attorney receiving such a communication would be prohibited
from sharing the letter with her client, but under the U.S. ethical
rules, a receiving attorney would be required to communicate the
128 It is
letter to her client because it contains a settlement offer.
impossible for the attorney to comply with both rules because they
directly conflict. In that instance, allowing or even requiring the
attorney to violate the foreign ethical rule can arguably be justified.
With rules that are merely inconsistent, where there is no direct
conflict, permitting violations of foreign rules or law may be less
justifiable. With inconsistent rules, one system permits (but does
not require) what the other system prohibits. In that situation, the
attorney is not facing a Catch-22, but rather a potentially strategic
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. Given a choice, the attorney
would typically prefer the rule that permits, or even requires,
conduct that is most advantageous for the client. For example, in a
deposition in Germany for a U.S. litigation, the U.S. attorney
would likely prefer to abide by U.S. rules that permit pretestimonial communications, particularly if the other side's counsel
were bound by the German prohibitions against such prohibitions
and the judge did not find out. In its current form, Rule 8.5 could
be read as relieving the U.S. attorney from any obligation to even
consider whether such pre-testimonial communication violates
German law or represents an affront to a German sense of
128 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 & cmt. (2002) (establishing the
U.S. requirement for client participation in the receipt of any and all settlement
communications).
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procedural fairness.
But with this and other examples of
inconsistent rules, an attorney could comply with both rules at the
same time. Accordingly, it is not clear why, in the absence of some
compelling circumstance, violation of a foreign rule should be
countenanced under Rule 8.5. To the extent that a violation of
foreign ethical rules or law can be justified, the process of
justification should require the exercise of discretion, or as
suggested above, judicial oversight, to evaluate the need for a
particular procedure against other factors, such as the interests of
the State whose laws or rules will be violated.
4.3. Ethics in InternationalProceedings
The quandary underlying the ethics of attorneys who appear
before international tribunals is not so much about double
deontology or finding which set of national rules should govern.
Instead, it is about matching the ethical rules to the attorney's
particularized role in that context, and freeing her from otherwise
conflicting national rules.
International tribunals alter the roles of the advocates who
appear before them.1 29 In performing these new roles, the national
ethical rules of those attorneys may become obsolete, if not
inapposite. 130 The pull of national ethical obligations remains
strong, however, because the attorneys arrive with preconceived
notions of their role that were shaped through an amalgam of
elements from their national systems.1 31 Meanwhile, many of the
formants that shape attorneys' national conceptions of their role
simply do not exist, or do not exist to the same extent, in
international contexts.

129 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 15, at 407 ("[Tlhe interrelational functional
roles of actors in the international arbitration system . . .are assigned by the
procedural arrangements of international arbitration and . . . reflect the
underlying cultural values of the international arbitration system.").
130 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997) (providing an overview on the
difficulties of applying the ethics rules meant to govern lawyers in adversarial
contests in the alternative dispute resolution context).
131 Cf. Judith A. McMorrow,
Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in
InternationalTribunals:A Case Study of the ICTY, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139,
146 (2007) (describing how legal education, malpractice standards, market and
informal social controls, and applicable mechanisms of self-regulation shape the
ethical obligations of attorneys in domestic contexts).
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As described above, international tribunals are detached from
any one national legal system. As a result, these tribunals do not
have their own cultural traditions and established malpractice
standards in the same sense that these features exist in national
systems. They have procedures and customary practices, but these
procedures are much newer (and in most cases less developed)
than equivalent procedures in national courts. 132 For these reasons,
some commentators have argued that international tribunals do
not need (or cannot have) their own ethical rules, but should
instead rely on choice-of-law principles to determine which
national ethical rules should apply. 133 While a conflict-of-laws
approach has the appeal of tapping into well-established and
institutionally grounded rules, national legal ethics cannot provide
meaningful guidance when the essential role of an advocate has
changed because they are operating in a significantly different
procedural and cultural context. Instead, what is needed for
attorneys to fully appreciate and function in their new role is
retraining or re-acculturation into the relevant international
system, and pertinent ethical rules to guide and facilitate that
process.
Some international tribunals have developed their own ethical
rules through a combination of pragmatism and re-acculturation.
Practice before international tribunals is a distinctive "blend of
international and domestic concepts and procedures, requiring
unique skills, experience, knowledge, strategic sense and training.
. .,,134
"
Since national legal training does not generally prepare
attorneys for practice before international tribunals, 135 professional
132 This observation is most true with respect to certain so-called public
international law tribunals, but less true with respect to international arbitration,
which is often touted as contributing to the development of international
procedures. See John R. Crook, Fact-Findingin the Fog: Determining the Facts of
Upheavals and Wars in Inter-State Disputes, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 313 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009).
133 See e.g., Kirsten Weisenberger, Peace is Not the Absence of Conflict: A
Response to Professor Rogers's Article 'Fit And Function In Legal Ethics,' 25 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 89 (2007) (arguing that extant rules of conducts are adequate for the purpose
of regulating international arbitrations, and a conflicts of laws approach is the best
option).
134 Richard J. Wilson, Assigned Defense Counsel in Domestic and International
War Crimes Tribunals: The Need for a StructuralApproach, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 145,
147 (2002).
135 This is less true today with the proliferation of international moot court
competitions to accompany the proliferation of international tribunals themselves.
While the Jessup Moot is the oldest moot, the new investment arbitration, and the
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competence often requires re-acculturation and re-training that
reshape an attorney's perception of their role as a domestic
attorney into their distinct role as a global advocate.
One of the most prominent examples of re-acculturation and its
relation to ethical norms is the ICTY. The ICTY is made of twentyfive judges from twenty-three different countries and "[t]he
defense bar of the ICTY has 257 members, drawn from multiple
legal traditions, with roughly half of the defense bar from the
former Yugoslavia.
...136 As part of their participation in ICTY
proceedings, attorneys are explicitly re-trained and culturally reorientated in order to develop professional and social norms that
are essential to performing the role assigned to them by the ICTY.
As a shorthand, this retraining can be summarized as taking
"[c]ivil and common law lawyers" and reorienting them to the
"new hybrid trial model [of the ICTY] and their role within that
model." 137 All attorneys at the ICTY undergo this re-orientation. It
has been particularly important, however, with respect to Sovietera trained lawyers, who viewed the role of the criminal defense
138
lawyer as an enemy of the state.
Once the role of attorneys before the ICTY was established,
new ethical norms appropriate to the new role were developed and

International Criminal Court Moot also offer students opportunities not only to
address international arguments under international procedures, but also to argue
against law students from other countries. For example, the Vis International
Arbitration Moot draws over 200 teams from around the world to Vienna, and
sixty-five teams to Hong Kong for the Vis East. See Fifteenth Annual Willem C.
Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot 2007-2008 Registered Teams,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/participants15.html (last visited Apr.
10, 2009); Sixth Annual Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration
Moot
(East)
2008-2009
Registered
Teams,
http://www.cisgmoot.org
/ParticipatingTeams.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). "[Plarticipation in the annual
Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot Court as a student is a
way of 'marking' oneself to the seasoned members of international commercial
arbitration as destined for greatness in the field." Benjamin G. Davis, The Color
Line in International Commercial Arbitration: An American Perspective, 14 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 461, 516 (2003); see also THE Vis BOOK: A PARTICIPANT'S GUIDE TO THE

(Janet Walker ed.,
2008) (demonstrating that international moot court experiences have become so
popular as to support a commercially available guide for participants).
136 McMorrow, supra note 131, at 148.

WILLEM C. VIS INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION MOOT

137 Id.
138 Mark S. Ellis, supra note 96, at 957 (2003) ("Many of the 'qualified' nonwestern attorneys were trained in the communist/socialist era, in a system that is
antithetical to the Tribunal's substantive and procedural laws.").
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eventually codified. 139 All this occurred despite the fact that
"[tihere was no shared history, background, or culture to help
determine the best course of action." 140
Despite this reacculturation and related new ethical rules, attorneys at the ICTY
still remain reluctant to engage in conduct that violates their home
ethical norms. The reason is that most national ethical rules do not
provide guidance similar to Rule 8.5 so that attorneys are (or
believe they are) still bound by their home ethical rules when
141
appearing before the ICTY.
A similar process of professional socialization and reorientation has occurred in international arbitration. For example,
when U.S. attorneys first began appearing in international
arbitration, they often engaged in systematic ex parte
communications with their party-appointed arbitrators.
This
142
arbitration
U.S.
domestic
in
acceptable
considered
practice was

139 See id. at 966-68 (outlining the development of the ICTY Code of
Professional Conduct).
140 See McMorrow, supra note 131, at 148.
141 See id. at 142-43 (noting that the tension between home and ICTY ethical
rules is alleviated in practice by providing two or more defense counsel who can
assign tasks among themselves based on their home jurisdiction rules); see also
Ellis, supra note 96, at 959 (noting the strategic "pairing" of defense counsel).
142 See, e.g., Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc., 68 F.3d 429 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that an arbitration award, which was based on arbitrators' determination
that parties had entered into binding settlement agreement even before agreement
was reduced to writing, was not "arbitrary and capricious."); Sunkist Soft Drinks,
Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 760 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding no
misconduct despite finding that party-arbitrator met with representatives and
witnesses of appointing party before arbitration to plan strategy); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Pyles, 701 F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("The
appearance of impropriety alone is insufficient; a party seeking to vacate the
award must establish facts that create a reasonable impression of partiality.").
These cases involved domestic U.S. arbitrations, which means that these
objections did not arise because of conflicting cultural perspectives on ex parte
communication. It should be noted that even in the United States, these practices
have met with significant criticism. See, e.g., James H. Carter, Improving Life with
the Party-AppointedArbitrator:Clearer Conduct Guidelinesfor "Non Neutrals," 11 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 295 (2000) (discussing non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators visa-vis neutral party-appointed arbitrators); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in
Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution: What's Happening and Ihat's Not, 56 U.
Miami L. Rev. 949 (2002) (reviewing the ethical issues in arbitration); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, The Party Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some
Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 59, 60 (1995) (noting that such partisanship among
arbitrators is not the norm in international arbitration). Recently, in response to
this problem, some institutions have clarified their arbitral rules to reflect that all
arbitrators are expected to act as "neutrals."
See, e.g., LONDON CT. INT'L
ARBITRATION ARBrrRAL R., art. 5.2 ("All arbitrators conducting an arbitration under
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and in some other countries, but rather abhorrent in international
arbitration practice generally, which deems permissible only
limited communication on procedural matters. 143 Through a
process of social re-orientation within the arbitration community,
an ethical norm against most forms of ex parte communication has
emerged. This norm is followed in most cases and is now
incorporated into various arbitral rules and codes of ethics.44
In another example, there was a notable gap in perceptions and
practices about extensive pre-testimonial preparation of witnesses
in international arbitration, as with the ICTY. 145 Skepticism about
pre-testimonial communication is most pronounced among
lawyers from civil law traditions. For example, German attorneys
are generally prohibited from engaging in pre-testimonial
communications with witnesses in German judicial proceedings.
German attorneys in international arbitration practice, however,
have professionally re-oriented and developed a new norm of

these Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and independent of the
parties; and none shall act in the arbitration as advocates for any party.").
143 See INT'L BAR ASS'N [IBA] R. OF ETHICS FOR INT'L ARBITRATORS, art. 5.3
(stating arbitrators should avoid "any unilateral communications regarding the
case" and to inform the other party of its substance if it occurs). For extended
discussion of ex parte communication in international arbitration, see W.
LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK, & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE ARBITRATION § 13.07 (2d ed. 1990); M. Scott Donahey, The Independence
and Neutralityof Arbitrators,9 J. INT'L ARB. 31, 41-42 (1992).
144 AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASS'N [AAA]/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canons III(B)(1) (permitting ex parte
communications with any member of the arbitral tribunal concerning such
matters as setting the time and place of hearings or making other arrangements
for the conduct of the proceedings); Id. Canon III(B)(1)(b) (permitting ex parte
communications by party-appointed arbitrators as long as general disclosure is
made); ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 225-26 (1991) (noting that "it is not unusual for there to
be discussions with just one of the parties in respect of procedural matters such as
availability for future hearings").
145 See Nicolas C. Ulmer, Ethics and Effectiveness: Doing Well by Doing Good, in
THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE: THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE

CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 167, 171 & n.8 (Geoffrey M. Beresford
Hartnell ed., 1996) (noting that it is not an uncommon practice for one arbitrator to
communicate with the appointing party); Ambassador Malcolm Wilkey, The
Practicalities of Cross-Cultural Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 79, 86 (Stefan N. Frommel
& Barry A. K. Rider eds., 1999) ("Contacts ex parte after all arbitrators have been
selected and assumed their duties should be forbidden. But sometimes they are
not.").
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professional conduct that treats such communications as ethically
146
permissible in the international arbitration context.
These developments signal that professional norms for
international tribunals are not only possible, but also critically
important to the fair and efficient functioning of proceedings. In
the absence of formally developed and codified codes, such norms
are emerging on an informal and ad hoc basis. While this appears
to be a positive development, it is not without problems.
Attorneys' home ethical rules continue to cast a "shadow" that "is
omnipresent for the lawyers and judges," 147 in part because the
prevalence of international rules over national rules is not well
understood.
While these ethical "improvisations" may provide an essential
stopgap before formal international ethical rules are codified, they
also have some serious drawbacks. Most importantly, they can
mask continued or new divisions, and they can evade established
enforcement mechanisms. For example, the new, unwritten ethical
norm permitting German attorneys to engage in pre-testimonial
communication in international arbitration does not prescribe any
limitations on this new enterprise, and it has not been formally
acknowledged or regulated by German bar authorities.
Without any express new rule to substitute for the rule that has
been displaced, the German attorney arguably has more latitude
than the American attorney in pre-testimonial communications.
An American attorney is still bound by U.S. ethical rules that
establish the limits of proper witness preparation, 148 even if those
limits can be "permeated by ethical uncertainty." 149 Those U.S.
ethical limitations, however, may not be obvious. A German
lawyer, originally shocked by pre-testimonial communications,
146 See Bernardo M. Cremades, Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role
of Interactive Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 145, at 147
(suggesting that arbitrators must distinguish the cultural background of parties in
order to effectively preside over proceedings to which parties come with differing
approaches to pre-testimonial communication with witnesses); Lucy Reed &
Jonathan Sutcliffe, The "Americanization" of InternationalArbitration?, 16 INT'L ARB.
REP. 37, 42 (2001) (suggesting that while some consensus has emerged about the
possibility of preliminary communication with witnesses, there remains conflict
as to the extent permitted).
147 McMorrow, supranote 131, at 142.
148 See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 829 (2002) (providing an overview of witness preparation in the United
States).
149 John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation,68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 281 (1989).
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might reasonably infer that U.S. attorneys operate with no limits
whatsoever in pre-testimonial communications.
This assumption would find considerable reinforcement in
popular portrayals of U.S. attorneys. For example, in the 1958 film
Anatomy of a Murder, a congenial but cynical defense attorney
played by Jimmy Stewart describes the legal defense to murder to
his client in such a way that his client is inspired to "recall" the
facts consistent with that defense. 150 While it makes for good
cinema, talking to "a witness about the law or about desired
testimony before seeking the witness' own version of events comes
dangerously near [criminal] subornation of perjury," 15 ' and is
generally considered a transgression of U.S. ethical rules. 5 2 The
German attorney, however, has no reason to know about these
limitations and no obligation to abide by them. As a result, even
with this ethical innovation designed to level the playing field,
attorneys in the same proceedings may still operate under different
rules. Making matters worse, these clashes may be even more
concealed and more difficult to discover than when the differences
were between formal, express and written rules. Finally, these
new, unwritten rules are, by design, outside of formal national
enforcement regimes.
This escape hatch raises separate and
important questions about who should enforce applicable ethical
rules, which is the topic of the next Section.
Rule 8.5, and arguably also Article 2.4 of the CCBE Code,
acknowledge the importance of international tribunals having their
own ethical rules that trump otherwise applicable national ethical
rules. These concessions, however, have had limited value because
to date few international tribunals have actually enacted codes of
ethics for the lawyers who practice before them. In the meantime,
the tug of national ethical rules has collided with the very practical
need for international ethical rules.

150 For a critique of Jimmy Stewart's technique, see Richard H. Underwood,
Perjury! The Chargesand the Defenses, 36 DuQ. L. REV. 715, 781-82 (1998).
151 CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.4.3 (1986).
152 See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Witness Preparation:When Does It
Cross The Line? 17 GRIM. JUST. 48, 49 (2002) ("At the same time that the lawyer is
required to thoroughly investigate and persuasively present the facts on behalf of
his or her client, both the criminal law and ethical rules prohibit the lawyer from
presenting false testimony.").
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4.4. Who Should Regulate Global Advocates? 5 3
The assumption underlying Rule 8.5 is that, wherever in the
world a global advocate operates and whatever rules apply, the bar
association that originally licensed the attorney should be the
primary, if not sole, authority that regulates her. This conclusion is
based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that the bar
association that has licensed the attorney has the greatest stake in
The licensing
ensuring the attorney's professional conduct.
association clearly has a direct interest in enforcing the rules it has
promulgated and upholding the integrity of those professionals it
has licensed. The force of these interests, however, may be
diminished when the misconduct occurred overseas and in
violation of foreign ethical rules and foreign law. A second
assumption is that only the licensing bar has the power to impose
professional sanctions, including disbarment. Particularly in light
of some of the problems described above,15 4 however, there are
reasons to question whether national regulatory authorities are
particularly competent to perform this task.
Apart from the conceptual difficulties in interpreting and
applying foreign ethical rules, there are also practical and
How can local regulatory authorities
procedural problems.
conduct disciplinary proceedings and factually assess whether
misconduct is present when the relevant events occurred
physically, culturally, and politically far away? While licensing
authorities should not be excluded from regulating global
advocates, this Section argues that they should not be the front line
regulators. Instead, they should work in coordinated efforts with
international and foreign tribunals to assess and enforce penalties
for ethical transgressions that are identified and evaluated with
foreign and international tribunal and regulatory authorities.
National regulatory authorities exist and operate in domestic
political and legal contexts. This national orientation inevitably
affects their ability to apply foreign or international ethical rules,
whose content may be both difficult to discern and contrary to
regulatory authorities' own institutional sense of proper attorney
conduct. For example, would U.S. disciplinary authorities be
inclined to punish a U.S. attorney for "improperly" preparing a
153 This title is borrowed from David B. Wilkins' seminal work:
Regulate Lawyers? See Wilkins, supra note 9.
154 See supra Section 2.3.4.
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witness when French ethical rules are deemed to apply under Rule
8.5, even though such conduct would otherwise be ethically
permissible or required under U.S. rules? Would U.S. authorities
condemn a U.S. attorney for disclosing information to a client that
was unequivocally valuable to that client, but which a foreign
system required be maintained as "confidential"? Alternatively, is
it possible to imagine a French bar association disciplining a
French attorney for unethically withholding discoverable
documents when no such offense exists in France and France has a
historical tradition of being hostile to the very notion of
1 55
discovery?
Regulatory authorities are not all-purpose machines into which
a set of ethical rules can be input at one end and a disinterested
disciplinary decision applying those rules is produced at the other
end. Like the lawyers they administer, the individuals who staff
regulatory authorities are products of a local legal culture15 6 Their
legal history, background, and training necessarily color their
perceptions about the propriety of attorney conduct and their
interpretation of rules applied to such conduct. 157 When filtered
through national regulatory authorities, international and foreign
legal ethical rules will be refracted through these national
perspectives.
The ambiguities inherent in legal translation
described above 158 will increase the potential for distortion. A
similar phenomenon has already been observed as substantive

155 France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, and
Canada have all enacted blocking statutes that forbid their citizens from
complying with certain U.S. discovery requests.
See William S. Dodge,
Extraterritoriality and Conflicts-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial
Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 164 & n.357 (1998) ("The extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws has led a number of other countries to enact
retaliatory legislation in the form of blocking and clawback statutes.").
156 There are international sections to state regulatory authorities, but they
play no role in discipline. Their functions are limited to organizing research,
networking opportunities, and symposia on issues of international law and
practice. SRA CODE OF CONDUCT R. 15 (2007).
157 Cf.Wilkins, supra note 9, at 810-11 (noting that, since enforcement officials
invariably exercise a certain amount of discretionary authority over the content of
professional norms when they apply ethical rules in particular cases, "conferring
enforcement authority is tantamount to empowering a particular set of actors to
place their own interpretation on these ambiguous professional norms").
158 See supra Section 2.3.4.
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international and foreign law have been distorted when
159
interpreted by national courts.
An equally important, and ultimately related, issue is that any
adjudicatory tribunal must have the ability to sanction and control
the behavior of attorneys appearing before them. The ability to
apply rules implies the ability to develop and refine their content.
International tribunals and their rules of conduct cannot, as one
commentator has suggested, be held "captive to out-of-state
disciplinary authorities." 160 The ICTY, which is the international
tribunal that has most directly engaged issues of ethical conduct
and regulation, has an established record of assessing alleged
misconduct by attorneys and issuing sanctions for contempt of
court. Some tribunals seem reticent to exercise any disciplinary
role, while other tribunals, particularly international arbitration
tribunals, seem to doubt their own power to do so (or face legal
impediments to doing so). The power to resolve important
international and transnational legal issues must be understood as
being accompanied by a power to control and regulate the
161
attorneys who participate in those proceedings.
5.

CONCLUSION

Many of the world's most urgent issues of transnational
regulation are increasingly being funneled into international and
transnational adjudications. These adjudications are brought and
managed by advocates whose ties and commitments to any
particular legal system are often partial and tangential. The
response to resulting ambiguities about what ethical rules apply to
their conduct has primarily been a reliance on choice-of-law rules
159 See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of
International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159,
160-75 (1993) (discussing reasons that prompt most national courts to approach
international norms apprehensively and limit their application within national
legal systems).
160 Daly, supra note 2, at 778. Daly refers to domestic U.S. courts being held
captive to the regulatory authorities of a different state, but the problem she
identifies is equally applicable in the international context.
161 This power may not be as acceptable in some other systems that do not
give judicial officers a role in domestic contexts. For example, in France,
professional regulations are enforced locally by the conseil de l'ordre, which is the
only organ that has the power to sanction members for violations of rules of
conduct. See CHRISTINA DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 120
(2d ed. 1996) ("[The conseil] has disciplinary powers and can sanction professional
faults or infringements of rules of conduct.").

1086

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 30:4

that designate particular national ethical rules. There is an
emerging realization, however, of the inadequacy of national
ethical rules, which were designed to apply to domestic practices
in domestic procedural contexts, in regulating global advocacy.
Moreover, regulatory authorities are limited in their ability to
apply foreign ethical rules or effectively evaluate conduct before
foreign tribunals through conventional modes of regulation.
The current version of Rule 8.5 was an important mechanism
for bringing these issues to light. Now, however, additional
systematic analysis is needed to provide more meaningful rules.
Those rules must be implemented not in isolation, but through
developed international networks and perhaps even eventually an
international regulatory body.

